752 { China’s Quest
United States and Australia. The Joint Declaration on the security agreement
proclaimed that India and Japan were: “partners with a mutual stake in each
other’s progress and prosperity .... that a strong and prosperous India is in the
interests of Japan and that a strong and prosperous Japan is in the interests of
India.” Because of this, the Declaration said, the two countries had “decided
to create a comprehensive framework for the enhancement of security coop-
eration between the two countries.”^34 All sorts of cooperation “mechanisms”
were set up under these agreements: annual strategic dialogues at the foreign
minister level, regular consultations between the national security advisors of
the two governments, annual sub-minister meetings of Foreign and Defense
Ministry officials, a maritime security dialogue, and so on.^35 In July 2010, reg-
ular combined dialogues between the defense and foreign ministers (“two
plus two”) of the two sides began.
None of these Indo-Japanese Declarations or “cooperation mechanisms”
mentioned China, let alone identified China as a matter of common con-
cern. That country could, however, be discerned between the lines. The Joint
Statement Vision for Japan-India Strategic and Global Partnership in the
Next Decade signed by Prime Ministers Manmohan Singh and Naoto Kan
in October 2010, for instance, referred to “a changing and dynamic Asia”
that led both countries to value bilateral cooperation in “sustaining peace
and prosperity.” China’s rise would clearly be a major factor of change and
dynamism in Asia. The Vision welcomed the launch of a India-Japan “dia-
logue on Africa at the official level” to achieve “wider policy consultation and
cooperation on foreign policy and security issues.” Implicit was the fact that
China’s assertive push for African resources posed challenges to both India
and Japan, which themselves sought those resources. The Vision called for
increased cooperation between the Indian navy and the JMSDF in the Gulf of
Aden. Unstated but implicit was the fact that the PLA-N had only two years
before begun sustained operations in the Gulf of Aden—astride both Japan
and India’s sea lines of communication with the Persian Gulf. The Vision
called for inclusion of the United States in the East Asia Summit—something
China opposed.^36
Practical military cooperation between India and Japan began in 2001,
when, following the 9-11 attacks and the US-led intervention in Afghanistan,
Japan’s navy entered the Indian Ocean for the first time since World War
II, as a small squadron of JMSDF vessels took up station to provide refuel-
ing support for Allied anti-Taliban operations. Japanese warships began qui-
etly refueling and resupplying at Indian ports. Following the US-led 2003
regime-change war in Iraq, Japan’s military role in the Indian Ocean rose
another notch when Tokyo sent a contingent of military engineers to assist
with the reconstruction effort in Iraq. Japan’s deployments in 2001 and 2003
marked major departures for Japan’s military role in SA-IOR and for the
Japan-India military relationship.