Reassuring and Unnerving India } 753
Late in 2008, China initiated a major increase in its naval presence and capa-
bilities in the Indian Ocean when it decided to send PLA-N warships to par-
ticipate in international antipiracy efforts that had been underway for several
years in the Gulf of Aden. Economic considerations partially motivated this
move. Insurance costs were rising for unescorted Chinese vessels and delivery
schedules were being disrupted putting Chinese businesses at a competitive dis-
advantage.^37 Whether or not China’s leaders considered the strategic impact of
this decision, those impacts were substantial. PLA-N warships established a per-
manent and robust presence in the Indian Ocean. PLA-N warships had visited
Indian Ocean ports a dozen or so times since the first visit in 1985, but those visits
had been transitory. Beginning in 2009, the PLA-N presence was enduring, with
one PLA-N task force replacing another after serving on station for four months.
PLA-N warships began frequent calls at ports all around the Indian Ocean littoral,
as illustrated by Figure 27-1. PLA-N commanders thus gained useful knowledge
of where they could get various supplies, replacement personnel, maintenance,
or repairs. PLA-N warships also began investigating such factors as currents,
temperature and salinity gradients, and sea floor terrain, knowledge essential
for effective operations, especially submarine and antisubmarine operations.
Sydney
Ho Chi Minh City
Port Kelang Singapore
Colombo
Muscat (17)
Salalah
Victoria
Dar es Salaam
AlgiersMaTaltaranto
Jeddah
Haifa
Alexandria
Crete
Piraeus
Varna
Istanbul
ShuwMaaikhnama
Abu DohaDhabi
Constantsa Sevastopol
Djibouti (11) Aden (13)
Toulon
Durban
Maputo
Karachi
Cochin
Sattahip
Rangoon
Manila
INDIAN
OCEAN
PACIFIC
OCEAN
1st exercise by PLAN warships
in waters south of Indonesia,
February 2014
1 to 4 visits by PLAN ships
More than 4 visits by PLAN ships
(actual number of visits in parentheses)
F IGU R E 27-1 Selected Indian Ocean Port Calls by PLA-N Antipiracy ships, Feb. 2009–Apr. 2013
Source: Andrew S. Erickson, Austin M. Strange, No Substitute for Experience: Chinese Antipiracy Operations in
the Gulf of Aden, (China Maritime Studies Institute monograph no. 10, U.S. Naval War College, November 2013); Trefor Moss,
“Beijing’s Power Play Exposes Anxieties,” Wall Street Journal, February 20, 2014, A10.