794 { Notes to pages 76–84
- Shen Zhihua, “China and the Dispatch of the Soviet Air Force: The Formation of
the Chinese-Soviet Korean Alliance in the Early Stage of the Korean War,” Journal of
Strategic Studies, vol. 33, no. 2 (April 2010), pp. 211–30. - This is Zhang’s central thesis in Mao’s Military Romanticism.
- Another authoritative source drawing on official Chinese data puts the figure at
152,000: Xu Yan, “The Chinese Forces and their Casualties in the Korean War: Facts and
Statistics,” Chinese Historians, vol. 6, no. 2 (Fall 1993), pp. 45–58. - Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War, Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, pp. 87–114. - This section follows Yafeng Xia, Negotiating with the Enemy; U.S.–China Talks
during the Cold War, 1949–1972, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006. - Xia, Negotiating, pp. 44–5.
- Xia, Negotiating, pp. 57–8.
- Deliberations on Indochina, however, were critically significant.
- Xia, Negotiating, pp. 51, 53.
- Xia, Negotiating, pp. 51, 53.
- Xia, Negotiating, p. 73.
- Chen Jian, Mao’s China, pp. 112–7. Kathryn Weathersby, using essentially the
same sources as Chen, concluded that Stalin’s death eliminated a key factor keeping
the war going for geostrategic purposes. See “Stalin, Mao, and the End of the Korean
War,” in Brothers in Arms; The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945–1963,
Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998, pp. 90–116. - Quoted in Rosemary J. Foot, “Nuclear Coercion and the Ending of the Korean
Confl ict,” International Security, vol. 13, no. 3 (Winter 1988–1989), pp. 93–106, 105. For an
exposition of US views on the efficacy of nuclear coercion, see Roger Dingman, “Atomic
Diplomacy during the Korean War,” in the same issue of International Security, pp. 50–91.
Dingman argues that US nuclear threats had no noticeable impact on China’s decision to
end the war; Foot argues that they played a role in that decision. - William R. Harris, “Chinese Nuclear Doctrine: The Decade Prior to Weapons
Development, 1945–1955,” China Quarterly, No. 21 (January–March 1965), pp. 87–95. - Proponents of the theory that the United States used BW in Korea include Stephan
L. Endicott, “Germ Warfare and ‘Plausible Denial,’ the Korean War, 1952–1953,” Modern
China, vol. 5, no. 1 (January 1975), pp. 79–104. Jon Halliday and Bruce Cumings, in their
influential 1988 book Korea: the Unknown War, New York: Pantheon Books, 1988 (p. 185),
maintain that the issue of US conduct of biological warfare in Korea “is open.” A careful
and persuasive rebuttal of this hypothesis drawing, inter alia, on evidence from the
Russian presidential archives is Milton Leitenberg, “New Russian Evidence on the Korean
War Biological Warfare Allegations: Background and Analysis,” CWIHP Bulletin, issue
11 (Winter 1998), pp. 185–99. Numbered documents below are from this collection. - Quoted in Shu Guang Zhang, Mao’s Military Romanticism, p. 182.
- Document No. 1, Bulletin, op. cit., p. 180.
- Document No. 2, Bulletin, op. cit., p. 180. The conduct of these investigations
was apparently linked to the succession struggle among Stalin’s heirs. Weathersby and
Leitenberg conclude that while this may cast doubts on the putative motives attributed to
Soviet participants in these activities, the outline of events presented in the documents
stands.