China\'s Quest. The History of the Foreign Relations of the People\'s Republic of China - John Garver

Notes to pages 104–113 } 797

28. Xia, Negotiating, pp. 87–8.


29. Xia, Negotiating, p. 89.


30. This is the central thesis of John W. Garver, The Sino-American Alliance; Nationalist
    China and U.S. Cold War Strategy in Asia, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1997.


31. Kuo-kang Shao, “Chou En-lai’s Diplomatic Approach to Non-aligned States in
    Asia, 1953–60,” China Quarterly, No. 78 (June 1979), pp. 324–38.


32. Huang Hua, Memoirs, p. 155.


33. Huang Hua, Memoirs, pp. 156–7.


34. Huang Hua, Memoirs, p. 160. Also George M. Kahin, The Asian-African Conference,
    Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1956.


35. Huang Hua, Memoirs, p. 161.


36. John Rowland, A History of Sino-Indian Relations:  Hostile Coexistence,
    Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1967, pp. 84–6.


37. China’s Foreign Relations, p. 215.


38. China’s Foreign Relations, pp. 207–8.


39. Anwar H.  Syed, China and Pakistan:  Diplomacy of an Entente Cordiale,
    Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1974, pp. 55–62. J. P. Jain, China, Pakistan,
    and Bangladesh, New Delhi: Radiant, 1974, p. 25.


40. Regarding India and US containment, see Dennis Kux, India and the U.S.: Estranged
    Democracies, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1993, pp. 87–143.


41. A  recent survey of Nehru’s effort to befriend China is Johan Loov, A Game
    of Chess and a Battle of Wits:  The Making of India’s Forward Policy 1961–1962,
    London: Bloomsbury, 2014,


42. A  imperial representative was installed in Lhasa circa 1720 along with a guard
    of several hundred. That small force constituted no threat to either British India or the
    Tibetan ruler, the Dalai Lama.


43. I develop these ideas more fully in Garver, Protracted Contest, Sino-Indian Rivalry
    in the Twentieth Century, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001, pp. 50–3.


44. Carlos P.  Romulo, The Meaning of Bandung, Chapel Hill:  University of North
    Carolina Press, 1956, pp. 10–21.


45. Regarding US policy at this juncture, see David Allan Mayers, Cracking the
    Monolith: U.S. Policy Against the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1949–1955, Baton Rouge: Louisiana
    State University Press, 1986. Gordon H. Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States,
    China, and the Soviet Union, 1948–1972, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990.

Chapter 5. The Sino-Soviet Schism

1. This interpretation of the Great Leap Forward follows Frank Dikötter, Mao’s Great
   Famine, the History of China’s Most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958–1962, New York: Walker,


2. Alexander V. Pantsov and Steven I. Levine, Mao: The Real Story, New York: Simon
   and Schuster, 2012. Thomas A. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic
   Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947–1958, Princeton:  Princeton University
   Press, 1996. Kenneth Lieberthal, “The Great Leap Forward and the Split in the Yan’an
   Leadership, 1958–1965,” in The Politics of China, edited by Roderick MacFarquar, 3rd ed.,
   Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 87–146.


3. Christensen, Useful Adversaries, pp. 214–15.