China\'s Quest. The History of the Foreign Relations of the People\'s Republic of China - John Garver

800 { Notes to pages 139–145

55. Key sources on the Taiwan Strait crisis are Thomas E.  Stolper, China, Taiwan,
    and the Ofshore Islands, Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1985. Tang Tsou, The Embroilment Over
    Quemoy: Mao, Chiang, and Dulles, Institute of International Studies, University of Utah
    Press, 1959. Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War, Chapel Hill: University of North
    Carolina Press, 2001. Regarding US policy and nuclear weapons, see H.  W. Brands,
    “Testing Massive Retaliation, Credibility and Crisis Management in the Taiwan Strait,”
    International Security, vol. 12, no. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 124–51.


56. Wu, Shinian lunzhan, p. 175.


57. In February, Syria and Egypt merged to form a unitary state, the United Arab
    Republic, as the first step toward formation of a pan-Arab state. The union lasted only
    till 1961. Communist strength was quite strong in Syria, and Nasserism was strongly
    socialist, Arab nationalist, and anti-imperialist (if also anticommunist). Then on July 14
    a clique of Army officers in Iraq overthrew the monarchy that had ruled that country
    under British auspices since 1921. Arab nationalist sentiment had been fanned by Iraq’s
    alignment with Britain during the 1956 war, and the new military leadership moved to-
    ward alignment with Nasser and withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact (a withdrawal that
    occurred in March 1959). Days of mob violence against “traitors” and Westerners followed
    the military coup in Iraq. It seemed as if a pan-Arab union was forming. Lebanon threat-
    ened to be swept into the Nasserist vortex.


58. Shichor, Middle East, pp. 65–73.


59. Quoted in Shichor, Middle East, p. 73.


60. Wu, Shinian lunzhan, p. 182.


61. Wu, Shinian lunzhan, p. 178.


62. Wu, Shinian lunzhan, p. 180.


63. Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War, p. 189.


64. Beijing denounced as false Gromyko’s account of his 1958 talks with Mao and Zhou
    when his memoir was published in 1988. Prominent Soviet China specialist Mikhail Kapitsa,
    who accompanied Gromyko to Beijing, substantiated Gromyko’s account. A. Doak Barnett,
    China and the Major Powers, Washington:  Brookings Institution, 1977, p.  36. The Soviet
    documents discussed by Vladislav M. Zubok in “Khrushchev’s Nuclear Promise to Beijing
    During the 1958 Crisis,” CWIHP Bulletin, issue 6–7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 219, 226 (which
    reply to Chinese suggestions that the Soviet Union might remain passive while US atomic
    bombs fell on China) also make sense only if Gromyko’s account is generally sound.


65. Wu, Shinian lunzhan, p. 180.


66. Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War, p. 189.


67. Zubok, “Khrushchev’s Nuclear Promise,” pp. 219, 226.


68. “Communication of the CPSU CC to the CCP CC, 27 September 1958,” in CWIHP
    Bulletin, issue 6–7 (Winter 1995–1996), pp. 226–27. Also Zubok, “Khrushchev’s Nuclear
    Promise to Beijing,” pp. 219, 226.


69. Zubok, “Khrushchev’s Nuclear Promise,” note 6, p.  227. An older but long dom-
    inant interpretation of Soviet-Chinese relations during the 1958 crisis maintained that
    Khrushchev’s letters to Eisenhower came only after Zhou’s September 6 call for US-PRC
    ambassadorial talks began to reduce tension, and that Mao was disappointed with
    Moscow’s tardy support. See Barnett, China and the Major Powers, p. 346 note 40.


70. Christensen, Useful Adversaries, pp. 221–2.


71. “Speech on the International Situation,” September 5, 1958, in Mao Zedong on
    Diplomacy, Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2007, pp. 264–69.