China\'s Quest. The History of the Foreign Relations of the People\'s Republic of China - John Garver

810 { Notes to pages 235–248

4. Regarding the US strategy of gradual escalation, see John E. Muller, “The Search
   for the ‘Breaking Point’ in Vietnam,” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 24, no. 4
   (December 1980), pp. 497–519.


5. This section follows Allen S.  Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence:  India
   and Indochina, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975.


6. This is a key thesis of Whiting, Chinese Calculus.


7. Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, pp. 130–1.


8. Quoted in Whiting, Chinese Calculus, pp. 173–4.


9. Ibid.


10. Quoted in Whiting, Chinese Calculus, pp. 174–5.


11. Whiting, Chinese Calculus, p. 177. Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, p. 132.


12. Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, p. 133.


13. Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, p. 134.


14. Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, p. 135.


15. Whiting, Chinese Calculus, p. 180.


16. Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, p. 137.


17. Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First, New York: Harper Collins, 2000, p. 596.


18. Whiting, Chinese Calculus, p. 188.


19. Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, p. 143.


20. Whiting, Chinese Calculus, p. 179.


21. Yafeng Xia, Negotiating with the Enemy:  U.S.-China Talks during the Cold War,
    1949–1972, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006, pp. 124–30. Kenneth T. Young,
    Negotiating with the Chinese Communists:  The United States Experience, 1953–1967,
    New York: McGraw Hill, 1968, pp. 208–75.


22. Xia, Negotiating, p. 129.


23. Allen Whiting analyzed in detail China’s deterrent rhetoric in its various grada-
    tions of intensity of warning. Whiting, Calculus of Chinese Deterrence.


24. Xia, Negotiating, p. 127.


25. Operations by semi-clandestine US army “long-distance reconnaissance patrols”
    into Laos were exceptions to this.


26. See Harry Summers, On Strategy:  A  Critical Analysis of the Viet Nam War,
    New York: Dell, 1982.


27. As discussed in chapter  3, recent scholarship on China’s entry into the Korean
    War indicates that Mao was strongly inclined to intervene in the war long before the
    Incheon landing reversed the fortunes of war in Korea, allowing US/South Korean forces
    to push north.


28. See Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, p. 152. Chen, Mao’s China, p. 230.


29. A central argument of Lien-hang T. Nguyen’s work is that there was chronic debate
    within the VWP between a “south first” and a “north first” group, the former favoring
    focus on liberation of the south and the latter favoring socialist industrialization of the
    north. Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, Hanoi’s War: An International History of the War for Peace
    in Vietnam, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012.


30. Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, pp. 152–3.


31. Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, p. 153.


32. Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, p. 153.


33. Chen, Mao’s China, pp. 230–1.