Notes to pages 249–261 } 811
- This discussion follows Nguyen, Hanoi’s War.
- The offensives that began with the Tet holiday in March 1968 continued throughout
the year, with consistently devastating consequences for the attacking forces. - “Conversations,” p. 105. Quoted in Nguyen, Hanoi’s War, p. 95.
- Nguyen, Hanoi’s War, p. 117.
- Nguyen, Hanoi’s War, pp. 50, 81.
- “Meeting between Chen Yi and Le Duc Tho,” Beijing, October 17, 1968. Quoted in
Nguyen, Hanoi’s War, pp. 126–7. - Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, p. 179.
- Nguyen, Hanoi’s War, p. 128.
- Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, pp. 173–4. Also Qiang Zhai, “Beijing and the
Vietnam Peace Talks, 1965–68: New Evidence from Chinese Sources,” Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars, Working Paper No. 18, June 1997. Available online at
http://wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ACFB46.pdf. - John Garver, “Sino-Vietnamese Conflict and the Sino-American Rapprochement,”
Political Science Quarterly, vol. 96, no. 3 (Fall 1981), p. 451. - Henry Kissinger, White House Years, Boston: Little Brown, 1979, pp. 716, 735, 757–8.
- Quoted in Garver, “Sino-Vietnamese Conflict,” p. 454.
- Ibid., pp. 454–5.
- Quoted in Garver, “Sino-Vietnamese Conflict,” p. 448.
- Tad Szulc, “How Kissinger Did It: Behind the Vietnam Cease-Fire Agreement,”
Foreign Policy, no. 15 (Summer 1974), p. 45. - Chou En-lai, “Report on the International Situation,” Issues and Studies 13 (January
1977), p. 122. - Chinese Aggression, Why and How It Failed, Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing
House, 1979, p. 33. - Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 735, 749.
- Ibid, p. 1052.
- Ibid, pp. 1073, 1087.
- At least this is Nixon and Kissinger’s argument. See Richard Nixon, No More
Vietnams, New York: Avon, 1985. Richard Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, Vol.
2, New York: Warner Books, 1978, pp. 433–6. Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval,
Boston: Little, Brown, 1982, pp. 302–38.
Chapter 10. The Cultural Revolution
- The standard PRC periodization used during the post-Mao era defines the entire
1966 through 1976 period as the Cultural Revolution. This makes sense, since throughout
that decade Mao’s radical policies dominated. China began to turn away from Mao’s to-
talitarian project only in 1976, after Mao’s death. Most non-PRC specialists, including this
author, distinguish the 1966–1969 period with its Red Guard uprising from the post–Red
Guard Maoist period, referring to this four-year period as the Cultural Revolution. - Peter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking’s Support for Wars of
National Liberation, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970, p. 217. - Regarding the utopian strain in Mao’s thinking, see Maurice Meisner, Mao Zedong,
a Political and Intellectual Portrait, Cambridge: Polity, 2007, pp. 140–92.