War in Korea and Indochina } 65
situation has changed from the situation in the past, and that North Korea
can move toward action; however, this question should be discussed with
China and personally with Comrade Mao Zedong.” “Comrade Mao Zedong
would like to have personal clarification of Comrade Filippov [Stalin’s code
name] on this question,” the Chinese query to Moscow read.^18 Soviet Premier
Vyshinsky replied the next day. His message read:
In a conversation with the Korean comrades Filippov and his friends
expressed the opinion that, in light of the changed international sit-
uation, they agreed with the proposal of the Koreans to move toward
reunification. In this regard a qualification was made, that the ques-
tion should be decided finally by the Chinese and Korean comrades to-
gether, and in case of disagreement by the Chinese comrades, the decision
on the question should be postponed until a new discussion. ... Filippov.^19
(Emphasis added.)
Stalin had craftily maneuvered Mao into having the final say on Kim’s
war plan. The Soviet leader had also made it clear that China, not the Soviet
Union, would be responsible in the event that things went wrong. It was
Stalin who was the undisputed leader of the socialist camp and world revolu-
tionary movement. It would be Soviet-supplied tanks, artillery, trucks, fuel,
and ammunition that would make the North Korean offense possible. It was
Soviet generals, veterans of World War II offensives, who drew up the plans
for the North Korean assault. And it was Soviet advisors who served with
North Korean forces until shortly before the attack, when they withdrew. Yet
it would be China that would fight Kim Il Sung’s war for him. Mao walked
into Stalin’s snare.
Scholars Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue argue that Stalin had cunningly
crafted a win-win situation for the Soviet Union. If the United States did not
intervene and South Korea fell to the KWP, the Soviet Union would secure
a stronger buffer against the Americans and a possibly rearmed Japan, plus
naval bases beyond the restrictive Straits exiting the Sea of Japan. If, on the
other hand and contrary to expectations, the United States intervened, China
would be enmeshed in war with the United Sates. That war would draw US
forces and attention away from Europe, which Stalin recognized as the center
of strategic gravity in the Soviet-US contest. Once the PRC and the United
States were entangled in war, it would be difficult for Washington to achieve
its desired opening to “Chinese Titoism.”
Mao apparently gave the green light for Kim to proceed. Goncharov,
Lewis, and Xue propose several reasons why Mao did so. Kim insisted that
North Korean forces could do the job alone and quickly, and would not need
Chinese assistance. Stalin had several times attempted to shackle CCP revo-
lutionary offensives, and Mao remembered those attempts bitterly. He, Mao,
would not now commit the same “great power chauvinist error” as Stalin, or