66 { China’s Quest
so Mao probably thought. Moreover, Taiwan had not yet been “liberated” by
the PLA, although Stalin had agreed in early 1950 to support that invasion. If
Mao said no to Kim’s war plan on the obvious grounds that the United States
might intervene, would not the same argument apply to Taiwan? Would not
the United States be equally likely to intervene in the event of a PLA inva-
sion of Taiwan? Mao could not warn against a war for South Korea without
undermining his own case for a war for Taiwan.^20 Moreover, had either Stalin
or Mao rejected Kim’s plan to “liberate” the south, their credibility as a res-
olute supporter of world revolution, perhaps to the advantage of the other,
would have been injured. From the very beginning, there was rivalry over
who, Moscow or Beijing, would lead the world revolution.^21China’s Decision to InterveneThe North Korean attack on June 25 did not go according to plan. The pro-
jected urban and peasant uprisings did not occur or were easily put down.
Many South Koreans did not want to live under communist dictatorship and
fought hard to prevent it. Most crucially, contrary to the signals Truman and
Acheson had given in January, the United States intervened. US and South
Korean resistance gradually gained in effectiveness. Still, North Korean
forces pushed the defenders steadily south toward what became by August a
small perimeter around the southeastern port city of Pusan.
Chinese leaders recognized as soon as the United States announced its
intervention on June 27 that the balance between North and South Korean
forces had altered to the North’s disadvantage.^22 CCP leaders doubted the
ability of North Korean forces to defeat the US reinforcements that were cer-
tain to arrive, and began considering if and how the PRC should send military
forces into Korea to shift the balance back to the North’s advantage. China’s
history had taught that Korea was an invasion corridor leading to China’s
Northeast. In 1592, and again in 1894, Chinese governments had sent armies
to Korea to expel Japanese invaders. Now, in 1950, a North Korean defeat
would leave Manchuria, China’s major industrial region exposed to the threat
of US imperialist attack. US defeat of North Korea would also be a major blow
to the Asian revolution. The revolutionary wave in Asia might die via de-
moralization before it gained momentum. By September, Mao was warning
his comrades that the Korean revolutionary forces would be “fundamentally
destroyed” by the Americans unless China intervened. Revolutionaries else-
where in Asia would be disheartened by an American defeat of the Korean
revolutionary movement. In China itself, “reactionaries” not reconciled yet to
CCP victory and socialism would be emboldened.
Kim Il Sung had not informed Chinese leaders about the configuration
or the date of his invasion. Not until June 27, two days into the offensive