War in Korea and Indochina } 67
and after Seoul was taken by Northern forces, did Kim notify Beijing of
the beginning of Korea’s liberation war. Kim was confident his forces
could achieve complete victory, and did not request Chinese assistance.
Kim may also have been leery of strengthening a pro-Chinese group that
challenged his authority within the KWP. In any case, as soon as notifi-
cation was received from Kim, Zhou Enlai arranged for the dispatch of a
group of military intelligence officers to Pyongyang to monitor develop-
ments in Korea.
US success on June 27 in securing Security Council authorization for
military intervention in Korea, and the growing flow of US reinforcements
into the area (a flow apparently observed by Chinese intelligence), deepened
Chinese apprehension. In early July, barely three weeks into the conflict and
while US and South Korean forces were still retreating toward Pusan, Zhou
Enlai convened a conference to begin preparations for intervention in Korea.
A new military command, the North East Border Defense Army (NEBDA),
was established and armies were redeployed from across China to that new
command. By the end of July, 255,000 soldiers were in position on North
Korea’s borders. A large logistical effort positioned materials for NEBDA
use: field hospitals, vehicles and fuel, ammunition, food, etc. Meanwhile, fe-
rocious and repeated North Korean attacks on the Pusan perimeter failed.
North Korean forces and logistic lines were subject to nearly constant US
bombing, while more and more US reinforcements flowed into Japan. Still
Kim Il Sung remained confident of success and did not call for Chinese help.
In fact, he did not reply to a Chinese suggestion that China send a group of
senior military observers to the south.
From the beginning of US intervention in Korea, Mao was acutely aware of
the linkage between the war in Korea and China’s domestic politics. American
intervention on China’s doorstep, and even more a US victory there, would
encourage resistance to CCP rule by Chinese unhappy with the still-recent
communist takeover. CCP control was still far from complete, and lenient
CCP policies toward those who changed sides during the civil war meant that
many people with an ambiguous stance toward the new CCP regime were
still loose. On the other hand, if the CCP could position itself as the defender
of China against American aggression, it would be able to clothe in nation-
alist colors its upcoming program of tightening control. If hatred could be
mobilized against US imperialist aggression against China, that hatred could
be used to cow the substantial number of Chinese who feared loss of their
economic holdings, their American movies, or their French-language classes,
or who desired liberal democratic government rather than Leninist dictator-
ship for China.
With North Korean forces thwarted in their repeated assaults on the
Pusan perimeter, Chinese leaders accelerated preparations for Chinese entry.
Mao outlined to a Politburo meeting in early August his thinking about the