the imperial and cultural purposes of his regime. If Hitler and his Germany were to have
avoided these great mistakes, they would need to have been other than who and what they
were in historical reality.
What follows is a typical list of Hitler’s alleged mistakes. To repeat, it obscures the
content of Nazi ideology and the degree to which it shaped assumptions and subsequent
behaviour. It is alleged that it was a grave mistake by Hitler:
- To seize the non-German remainder of Czechoslovakia in March 1939. This
belatedly mobilized Anglo-French opinion and policy for war ‘next time’. But Hitler
was determined on war in 1939. Consolidation of Germany’s position in Central
Europe and the acquisition of Czech military assets were necessary as preparation
for the war to come. - To invade Poland. After all, this action triggered Anglo-French belligerency. But the
destruction of Poland was the essential first step on the march to the East. War with
France, and possibly Britain, was always viewed as a necessity. - To invade Norway in April 1940. Although it was an effective joint operation by
the three armed services, it was a strategic disaster because Germany lost too much
of its already unduly small navy in the exercise. Later that year, the ships lost or
damaged off Norway might have made the difference to the feasibility of a cross-
Channel invasion. But in April 1940 Hitler could not foresee the need to prepare for
an invasion of Britain. However, he did appreciate the long-term value of bases in
Norway. The successful Norwegian venture was not a mistake. It was a pre-emptive
move to forestall an Anglo-French landing. - Not to invade Britain. If such an invasion had been likely to succeed, then indeed it
was a great mistake. On balance, though, the decision not to invade, keyed for public
consumption to the plausible excuse of the continued existence and combat readiness
of the RAF, was not a mistake. It is highly improbable that the German invasion
armada could have survived what undoubtedly would have been assault by droves of
the Royal Navy’s smaller warships, assault pressed home with suicidal determi-
nation. Of particular note was the fact that the Royal Navy had as many as eighty
destroyers in home waters. Even had the Luftwaffe performed better than it did
against RAF Fighter Command, it is a certainty that the Royal Navy would have
delivered Hitler his first crushing defeat. - To help Mussolini in North Africa and in Greece in the spring of 1941. It was a
nuisance to divert from preparation for Barbarossa to invade Yugoslavia and Greece.
But it was necessary to eject the British from Greece, because of the threat that their
air power would have posed to Germany’s vital oil supply from Ploesti in Romania.
Also, it was prudent to consolidate Germany’s southern flank before invading Russia.
Although the armoured and air assets lent to the Italians in North Africa were only
modest in scale, there is no denying that they would have been of greater strategic
value to Germany in Russia than in North Africa. Hitler sent Erwin Rommel with the
Afrika Korps, later titled Panzer Armee Afrika, which eventually was to comprise
two panzer and two under-strength infantry divisions. Also, he dispatched the
Luftwaffe’s Air Corps X from Norway to Sicily (with 500 planes). At the end of 1941
the Germans were obliged to divert Luftflotte 2 from Russia in order to rescue
Rommel from impending logistical disaster.
152 War, peace and international relations