- To invade Russia. Many people make the mistake of arguing that because Germany
failed in Russia, the attack must have been an error. But the invasion of the Soviet
Union was not a German mistake; rather, it was the essential step towards seizing
the territory needed for establishment of the German racial empire. War with Russia
was ideologically and strategically necessary. There is a sense in which the offensive
against Russia was what Nazi Germany was all about. It could not fulfil its destiny
unless it attacked Russia. And 1941 was a prudent choice for the timing of the
invasion: the Red Army appeared still to be a rabble; there was no menace of note
from Britain in the West; and the German people had to be prevented from settling
into a post-war frame of mind, satisfied with the victory over France in June 1940.
Nazi Germany was an ideologically driven state built for war. Russia was both next
in line geostrategically and the current tenant of the land that the Reich must seize
if it were to realize its destiny as visualized by the Führer. - To declare war on the United States. This was a gratuitous act by Hitler on
11 December 1941. But it is worth noting that war with the United States was
accepted by Hitler as an inevitability. His was an act of solidarity with his Japanese
ally, in keeping with a promise he had made, committed in a mood of some euphoria
occasioned by Pearl Harbor. Hitler overvalued the strategic worth of Japan as a first-
class maritime ally. Also, he undervalued the ability of the United States to wage
what would amount to two separate wars half a world apart. In retrospect, Hitler’s
needless declaration of war was a grave error in statecraft. However, if one is faithful
to the historical context, one has to recognize that in early December 1941, despite
the bad news from the Moscow front, Hitler anticipated winning the war in Russia
in 1942. Had Germany won its continental war in that year, American belligerency
most probably would have been a strategic irrelevance.
To recap, three broad explanations of Germany’s defeat have been suggested here, each
of which has some merit: (1) a resources shortfall – Germany attempted to wage too
much war with too few assets; (2) the hideous nature of the regime, and the personality
and beliefs of its all-powerful leader; (3) errors in statecraft, military strategy and
operational direction. One can argue the case for the inevitability of German defeat based
on any one of these explanations, let alone a compilation of all three. Because of the
extravagance of its goals and the extremity of its aggressive and criminal behaviour, it is
probable that the Third Reich was doomed to go down in the flames of total defeat.
However, it is well to remember that no country conducts foreign policy faultlessly or
military campaigns immaculately. In other words, to claim credibly, even self-evidently,
that Hitler made mistakes in his direction of the war is not to offer a penetrating insight.
Germany’s problem in the early 1940s was that the nature of its regime and the character
of its leader afforded it, and its enemies, no way out from a total struggle for victory and
survival or death. Hitler’s Germany could not, and would not be permitted by others to,
arrest or reverse its course, except by the military pressure of its enemies.
Conclusion
Chapter 1 introduced six themes which run throughout the strategic history in this text.
Generally, the themes have not been highlighted explicitly, but rather have been allowed
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