3 CONFERENCES AT PRAGUE AND BERGEN AND THE LOOMING WAR 321(i) Is the war likely to weaken or strengthen Japan’s power to capitalise her
conquest? (ii) How seriously will China be weakened by being deprived of
material aid from the belligerent nations? (iii) How does the European war
affect the position of (a) the United States and (b) the USSR in the Far
East? (iv) Is it likely that the present stand of the Indian National Congress
will effect the policy of the British Government with regard to the Far East,
and, if so, in what ways? (v) Is the European war likely to result in a new
alignment of forces in the Far East? e.g. what is the likelihood of Great
Britain and France coming to terms with Japan and acquiescing in Japan’s
conquest of China? Would the United States be likely to join in such an
agreement and, if not, what alternative policy would it probably pursue?^285In the course of addressing the question of the position and policies of
Japan, the first set of round table groups discussed the political structure
of the New Order in East Asia as proclaimed by Konoe on December
14, 1938 and by Arita Hachirō on December 19. It noted the former’s
declaration that the New order in East Asia would ‘be based on a tri-par-
tite co-operation of a new China with Japan and Manchukuo’ and the
latter’s insistence that Japan ‘does not intend to injure rights and inter-
ests of Third Powers, if they will “appreciate the real intentions of Japan
and adopt such policies as will conform with the new situation in East
Asia.”’^286 In the view of the experts at the meeting, the so-called New
Order in East Asia, like the Japanese doctrine of East Asia for the East
Asiatics, was nothing but a smoke-screen behind which Japan was seek-
ing to enslave China and dominate the Pacific and the Japanese ambi-
tions in regard to East Asia entailed the elimination of American and
European influences from the region.^287
It was clear to members discussing the position and policies of China in
the context of the second set of round table groups that the ‘Chinese will
to resist [Japan]...was one of the crucial’ and dynamic ‘factors in whole
Far Eastern situation.’^288 Members noted that despite the overwhelming
superiority of Japan in respect to military power and preparedness, Chinese
resistance had been consistently maintained for over two years. Chinese
members and members who had recently visited China, explained the
(^285) Mitchell and Holland, eds., Problems of the Pacific, 1939, 284–86.
(^286) Ibid., 27.
(^287) Ibid., 28.
(^288) Ibid., 40.