322 J.-A. PEMBERTON
strength of the Chinese resistance in terms of its roots in an ‘astonishing
political solidarity of a kind hitherto hardly considered possible in a coun-
try of such constantly shifting factions and military cliques.’^289
According to Chinese members, this political solidarity was not a mere
reaction to the war with Japan: a more important factor in explaining
this solidarity was the programme of administrative consolidation that
had been steadily pursued by the National Government over a period of
many years. Chinese members pointed out that this underlying process
of administrative unification was the product of a condition that foreign
observers tended to overlook: ‘the persistence through all the period of
civil wars and political intrigues of a deep-seated cultural and social unity
which modern education, industry, communications and foreign aggres-
sion had served to intensify and bring to the surface.’^290 The round
tables concerning China could reach no conclusion as to whether or
not Free China would be able to maintain its resistance. Members were
uncertain as to the answer to this question principally because they felt
that China’s future as with that of Japan was probably ‘destined to be
determined more and more by events in the outside world and the poli-
cies of other nations.’^291
The third set of round table groups explored the question of the influ-
ence of external events and the policies of other nations on the outcome
of the Sino-Japanese conflict. According to the meeting’s proceedings,
the discussion of the position and policies of the Western powers was
‘the most animated and controversial’ of all the discussions that took
place at the meeting.^292 The topics suggested by the meeting’s agenda
under the heading of the position and policies of the Western powers
were discussed in relation to each of the following countries: Australia,
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the
Philippines, the United Kingdom, the USSR and the United States.^293
According to the record of proceedings, a majority of members were
convinced that neither China nor Japan would be able to definitively
settle the conflict between them on their own terms and assumed that
(^289) Ibid.
(^290) Ibid.
(^291) Ibid., 76.
(^292) Ibid., 77.
(^293) Ibid.