How
MilitarySlaveryFirstOccurred 173the
time.
Althoughonlyhumbleauxiliaries,
theyfoughtoftenandin
large
numbers.The factthatevenfreenon-Arabiansfought
asmawlasdidmuchto
perpetuateArabiansupremacy,
forasmawlasthey
provided
serviceson
highlyfavorableterms.When free
non-Arabian Muslims
acceptedsubservient, evenservile,
positions,they
forfeitedachanceto
gainpower
ontheirown.Had
they
heldoutforbetterterms,the
Arabianswouldhavefaced
severe
shortagesofsoldiersand
mightwellhavemadeconcessions
to
gaintheirassistance.
Byacceptingemploy-mentoninferiorterms, the freemawlas contributed to themaintenanceofArabianruleandprivilege.ThetransitionfromArabian armipotence (13-64/634-84)
to Arabian
hegemony(64-132/684-750)
indicatedArabian,notmawla,
strength.InviewoftheIslamicate
patternsuggestedinchapter3,
en-rollmentofmawlasinthe
periodafter64/684hastwo
irregularfeatures. First,individualsoldiersandtheirtriballeaders,not
thecentral
government,recruitedthesenewsoldiers; thiswasnotamatterof
preference,butwasdue
tothefactthatthecen-tral
governmentlackedthe
authorityto
bringinsoldiersonitsown.Second,the
newsoldierswereMuslimsand
subjects,notaliensfrom
beyondthe
empire’sboundaries.Eveniftheydid
notenjoythe
privilegesoftheArabians,mawlaswere Muslimsparticipatinginthe
army,andthisanomalyrequiresexplana-
tion.Perhapsthespecial
conditionsof
earlyMuslim
societyex-plainit;atthistime,mostwarfarewas
stillfihgd,sothatMuslimshadreasonto
jointhearmedforces.Also,inMarwanidtimes,
Muslimsconstituted
onlya
tinyportionofthe
populationruledby
theUmayyads;according
toastatistical
analysisofnames
byRichardW.
Bulliet,in64/684Muslimsmade
up3 to 4
percentofthe
populationinTunisia,Egypt,Syria,Iraq,
andIran. Sucha
small
minoritycouldnot
possiblyfeelsecure
enoughtowith-drawfrom
publicaffairs.Even
thoughMuslimswieldedenor-mous
power,theirholdwastoo
shakyforthemto
relinquishittoothers.The first time Muslimrulersneeded to
replaceunreliablemarginal
areasoldiers,theyturnedtotheiroutsider
subjectsand
60.Bulliet,pp.97,
109,83,44.