192 e lusive v ictories
could dictate the pace of the transition, a refl ection of his assumption
that non-white populations were unready for self-government and
required a period of tutelage under international auspices.
By contrast, Churchill clung to the past, refusing to recognize that
the foundations of white rule had been swept aside by the war, espe-
cially in Asia, where the Japanese proved that the colonial intruders
could be beaten. He also failed to appreciate the full magnitude of both
American ascendance and the enfeebled economic condition of his own
country. A virtually bankrupt Great Britain would be in no position to
aff ord the costs of preserving its empire, the pieces of which rapidly
began to fall away after the war, beginning with Indian independence
in 1947. Notwithstanding his own revisionist eff orts to rewrite his
record in dealing with Stalin, moreover, Churchill accepted as readily as
Roosevelt did the reality of Soviet hegemony over Poland and the rest
of Eastern Europe. Th e prime minister’s call for Anglo-American
forces to advance as far across Germany as possible and capture Berlin
was rightly rejected as pointless by Eisenhower, who understood that
the troops would need to withdraw immediately following a German
surrender to the prearranged occupation zones.
As military strategists, both men had their limitations, but Roosevelt
demonstrated a greater ability to focus on the central military tasks.
He made his worst mistakes before the United States entered the war,
as he tried to balance the competing threats posed by Germany and
Japan. Once war came, he remained steadfast in his commitment to the
Germany First strategy and shrewdly appreciated the need to get Amer-
ican forces into combat against the Germans before American public
opinion might compel a shift against the more hated Japanese enemy.
But he also did not follow the advice of his own senior commanders,
especially General Marshall, to push for an early cross-Channel
invasion. Instead the president waited until Americans constituted the
majority of Allied formations in the European theater and then held
fi rm on the spring 1944 invasion timetable. Not only would this be the
fastest way to defeat Germany, but it also countered the possibility that
the Red Army would liberate all of Western Europe and establish
permanent Soviet control over the region. In the Pacifi c the president
backed selective moves to check the Japanese advance and initiate
limited off ensives, such as at Guadalcanal. His leadership faltered only