f reedom of a ction 193when American victory became certain: he let MacArthur’s Philippine
gambit go too far and, arguably, waited too long to seek alternatives to
the absolute unconditional surrender formulation.
Churchill showed a willingness to make tough decisions and showed
broad strategic imagination. Notwithstanding the distasteful aspect of
waging war upon a former ally, he ordered attacks on the French fl eet
in summer 1940 to keep its ships out of German hands and against
Vichy forces in Lebanon and Syria in 1941 that secured British control
over the Middle East and its vital oil supplies. He risked leaving Great
Britain itself vulnerable to invasion to reinforce Commonwealth armies
in the Middle East. Although his decision to aid Greece in early 1941 led
to a stinging military defeat there and on Crete, he acted according to
a legitimate political concern—Great Britain had strong ties to Greece.
Th e invasion of North Africa in late 1942, which the prime minister
strongly urged, let the Americans gain experience fi ghting the Germans,
promoted cooperation between U.S. and British commanders, and
made possible a major victory over the Axis that fi nally cleared them
from North Africa and the Middle East. Additional operations in the
Mediterranean in 1943 brought signifi cant gains, such as the surrender
of Italy and relocation of more German formations into Italy and
Greece. Perhaps most important, Churchill showed an early appreci-
ation for the critical Atlantic supply line, which, if severed, would doom
any prospect of bringing American military might to bear upon
Germany.
But there are marks to enter on the negative side of the ledger, too,
including excessive haste, a preoccupation with “prestige” objectives,
and a fascination with operational sideshows and glamorous special
operations bereft of strategic return. Churchill’s incessant hectoring of
Wavell to strike the Germans at Tobruk resulted in a premature
off ensive and defeat, for which only the general was held accountable.
Th e prestige of the British Empire and how it was perceived by its col-
onized non-white subjects also weighed too heavily in the prime minis-
ter’s decision making. When British defenses collapsed in Malaya in
December 1941–January 1942 and it became evident that Singapore was
doomed to fall, he still permitted another 25,000 men to be shipped in
for the fi nal defense. Somehow he persuaded himself that this gesture
would make a positive impression upon Asian and Commonwealth