358 e lusive v ictories
At the same time, citizens’ capacity to check presidential belligerency
is very limited. I have argued that presidents can engineer circumstances
to make military confl ict unavoidable. Th is is not meant to imply that
they act in bad faith. Quite the opposite: in every instance, they have
believed sincerely that the national security of the United States requires
military action, a decision none has taken lightly. Once persuaded of
the need to go to war as a matter of national security, however, they also
see it as essential to move the public to their position, an eff ort that
does not encourage questions. Citizens typically lack the information
that would let them challenge an administration’s depiction of a
national security crisis. After a confl ict begins, moreover, citizens can do
little in the short run to infl uence its course, even when the war goes
badly. Congress has never shown itself willing to terminate a war when
American troops are still fighting. Were Congress to dictate disen-
gagement from an unpopular confl ict by cutting off funds, the legis-
lative branch would also acquire responsibility for what follows. “In war
victory has a thousand fathers but defeat is an orphan.” Congress has
no wish to become its adoptive parent.
Although popular opposition does not stop a war, challenges to pres-
idential leadership remain critically important. Absent hard questions,
presidents will stick doggedly to their chosen course, even if it has
failed. Under pressure, presidents react defensively, accusing their
domestic foes of giving aid and comfort to the enemy. Nonetheless,
regardless of what presidents say in public, they cannot shield them-
selves from criticism of war policy that enters the political mainstream.
At that point, protest compels the reexamination of policy and will
likely yield new diplomatic and/or military initiatives. Skeptical citizens
can overcome wartime inertia, a critical role that is in the interest of the
nation and those who lead it.
Presidents often underestimate the American people. A president
owes it to the nation to make plain the dangers of military action and
ask all to share in the cost. Instead, however, presidents secure support
by not asking for sacrifi ce—a Faustian bargain. Th ey believe citizens
will tolerate bloodletting only if the blood is not theirs. (Th e temp-
tation to fi ght wars this way, moreover, increases when the troops are
volunteers.) But when a nation goes to war, leaders and citizens depend
on each other. Victory may not be swift, or easy, or cheap. And if things