370 notes to pages 5‒13
- Linn, Th e Philippine War ; John M. Gates, “Philippine Guerillas, Ameri-
can Anti-Imperialists, and the Election of 1900,” Pacifi c Historical Review
46 (1) (February 1977): 51–64. - Th ucydides, Th e Peloponnesian War (New York: Modern Library, 1951).
- Th ucydides, Th e Peloponnesian War , 45.
- Carl von Clausewitz, On War , Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds.
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976, 1989). - See, for example, John Yoo, Crisis and Command: A History of Executive
Power from George Washington to George W. Bush (New York: Kaplan,
2010). - Samuel P. Huntington, Th e Soldier and the State: Th e Th eory and Politics of
Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 1957). - My analysis divides military aff airs into three levels: the strategic, the
operational, and the tactical. Th e fi rst, strategy, addresses the larger plan
behind a war; the intermediate or operational refers to particular cam-
paigns within the larger strategic design; and the tactical covers actual
methods of fi ghting an enemy. Although this distinction is common
among military theorists and many writers on military matters, it is not
universal. Some writers speak of grand strategy, to refer to the general
approach a country adopts in pursuit of its national interest in the inter-
national arena. Journalists, on the other hand, often collapse the strategic/
operational distinction. - Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in
Wartime (New York: Anchor Books/Random House, 2002). - Cohen, Supreme Command , chap. 6.
- On the problems of planning for peace, see Gideon Rose, How Wars End:
Why We Always Fight the Last Battle (New York: Simon and Schuster,
2010). - George C. Edwards III, Th e Strategic President: Persuasion and Opportunity
in Presidential Leadership (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009). - Stephen Skowronek, Presidential Leadership in Political Time: Reprise and
Reappraisal (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008), 162ff. - Joseph R. Avella, “Th e President, Congress, and Decisions to Employ
Military Force,” in Th e Presidency Th en and Now , ed. Phillip G. Hender-
son (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefi eld, 2000), 51–52. - Avella, “Th e President, Congress, and Decisions to Employ Military
Force,” 57. - Louis Fisher, “Congressional Checks on Military Initiatives,” Political
Science Quarterly 109 (1994–1995): 739–62. - It is more accurate in this context to speak of the Framers’ mixed
intentions. Alexander Hamilton stressed the need for an energetic
chief executive who could act with dispatch in a crisis. For him,
unilateral executive initiative in a national security emergency would