Elusive Victories_ The American Presidency at War-Oxford University Press (2012)

380 notes to pages 73‒83

130. Donald, Lincoln , 564.


131. On the divisions within the Republican Party, see especially Bensel,
     Yankee Leviathan.


132. Bensel, Yankee Leviathan , 14, 238, 303–5.


133. James M. McPherson, Th is Mighty Scourge: Perspectives on the Civil War
     (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 216.


134. McPherson, Th is Mighty Scourge , 210–11.


135. McPherson, Th is Mighty Scourge , 211–12.


136. James McPherson contends that due to odd-year spring congressional
     elections in some northern states, July 1861 was the earliest that the new
     Congress could meet. See McPherson, Th is Mighty Scourge , 211. But this
     presumes there was more to be gained by having states such as Kentucky
     send representatives than by having Congress approve war measures
     through the established legislative process. Given that Congress would be
     incomplete anyway—the seceded states had withdrawn—the sacrifi ce of
     constitutional propriety seems too great.


137. McPherson, Th is Mighty Scourge , 214.


138. Cooper, Jeff erson Davis , 415.


139. McPherson, Th is Mighty Scourge , 213. Although the Confederate gov-
     ernment used its power to suspend habeas corpus more selectively, it
     does not follow that civil liberties were any more secure in the South.
     In areas of strong Unionist sentiment such as East Tennessee, extraju-
     dicial repression of Unionists assumed savage form, including murders
     without trial.


140. McPherson, Th is Mighty Scourge , 216.


141. McPherson, Th is Mighty Scourge , 216.


142. Fechter, Lincoln and the Civil War State , 339.


143. McPherson, Th is Mighty Scourge , 215.


144. McPherson, Th is Mighty Scourge , 218–20.


145. McPherson, Th is Mighty Scourge , 209. Andrew Jackson earlier insisted
     that a president might veto a bill on policy grounds alone, but Whigs
     saw that as another example of an overreaching executive. Th us, although
     Lincoln plainly disagreed with Wade-Davis as policy, he felt it necessary
     to rationalize the veto on a constitutional basis.


146. McPherson, Th is Mighty Scourge , 214–15.


147. Fechter, Lincoln and the Civil War State , 333.


148. McPherson, Th is Mighty Scourge , 215.


149. Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address , 449.

Chapter 2

1. Robert H. Ferrell, “Woodrow Wilson: A Misfi t in Offi ce?” in
   Commanders in Chief: Presidential Leadership in Modern Wars , ed. Joseph
   G. Dawson III (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1993), 65–86. Among
   the strongly pro-Wilson accounts, see especially Arthur Link and John