Elusive Victories_ The American Presidency at War-Oxford University Press (2012)

392 notes to pages 148‒152

52. Larrabee, Commander in Chief , 91.


53. Roosevelt’s decision reversed long-standing American defense policy,
    which had regarded the Philippines as a strategic liability and so had
    rejected any steps to reinforce them. Th e prior plans had assumed the
    Philippines would be relieved or if necessary reconquered after the U.S.
    Navy regained control over the sea lanes across the Pacifi c.


54. Emerson, “Franklin Roosevelt as Commander-in-Chief in World War II,”
    189–90; Larrabee, Commander in Chief , 312–14.


55. Gullan, “Expectations of Infamy,” 516; Larrabee, Commander in Chief , 114.


56. In addition, even before Japan announced its intention to exit the naval
    limitation regime, the Japanese navy started to build ships larger than
    permitted by treaty.


57. Emerson, “Franklin Roosevelt as Commander-in-Chief in World War II,”
    187. On the political economy of American mobilization in the Second
    World War, see Paul A. C. Koistinen, Arsenal of World War II: Th e Political
    Economy of American Warfare, 1940–1945 (Lawrence: University Press of
    Kansas, 2004).


58. Gullan, “Expectations of Infamy,” 512–16; Larrabee, Commander in Chief ,
    106–7.


59. Gullan, “Expectations of Infamy,” 510.


60. Emerson, “Franklin Roosevelt as Commander-in-Chief in World War II,”
    183–85.


61. Gullan, “Expectations of Infamy,” 518.


62. Larrabee, Commander in Chief , 117; John A. Th ompson, “Conceptions
    of National Security and American Entry into World War II,” Diplomacy
    and Statecraft 16 (2005): 671–97, at 678.


63. For a full discussion of the legislation and its eff ects, see J. Garry Cliff ord
    and Samuel R. Spencer, Th e First Peacetime Draft (Lawrence: University
    Press of Kansas, 1986).


64. When the war in Europe began in September 1939, unemployment in
    the United States was still more than 17 percent. Mark Allan Eisner, Th e
    State in the American Political Economy: Public Policy and the Evolution
    of State Economy Relations (Englewood Cliff s, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1995),
    194–95.


65. Gullan, “Expectations of Infamy,” 516.


66. Worried over the long-term return on investment in plants dedicated to
    defense production, business leaders were reluctant at fi rst to build new
    facilities. But a combination of carrots (the federal government fi nanced
    new factories) and sticks (the government could threaten the survival of
    non-cooperating fi rms) overcame business hesitation. Eisner, State in the
    American Political Economy , 198–99.


67. Gullan, “Expectations of Infamy,” 520.


68. Robert Higgs, Crisis and Leviathan: Critical Episodes in the Growth of
    American Government (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 203.