404 notes to pages 216‒223
- Hess, Presidential Decisions for War , 107–8, 110; Dallek, “Lyndon Johnson
and Vietnam,” 150. - Dallek, “Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam,” 151; Brands, Wages of Globalism ,
242. - Schandler describes the beginning of sustained bombing as an eff ort
“to broaden the reprisal concept... as gradually and imperceptibly as
possible.” Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam , 15. - Schandler, Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam , 21–22; Hess, Presidential
Decisions for War , 106. - Hess, Presidential Decisions for War , 110; Brands, Wages of Globalism ,
232–33; Dallek, “Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam,” 152. On the risks of
embarking on a protracted war without strong public support, see
Summers, On Strategy , 12–13. - Hess, Presidential Decisions for War , 111.
- For a detailed account of the process of writing the speech and testing
some of its key themes in advance within the administration and with key
press and congressional leaders, see Kathleen J. Turner, Lyndon Johnson’s
Dual War: Vietnam and the Press (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1985) , chap. 5. - Lyndon B. Johnson, “Peace without Conquest,” April 7, 1965, Johns
Hopkins University, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States:
Lyndon B. Johnson , 1965, Book 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing
Offi ce, 1966), 394–99. - Johnson, “Peace without Conquest.”
- Johnson, “Peace without Conquest.”
- Johnson, “Peace without Conquest.”
- Robbins, Th is Time We Win , 20.
- For a discussion of the implications of the limits of American power in
the 1960s, see Brands, Wages of Globalism. - Johnson, “Peace without Conquest.”
- General Westmoreland called for a staggered buildup of American forces
from 1965 forward because South Vietnam simply could not accommo-
date the more rapid arrival of American troops. Schandler, America in
Vietnam , 106–7. - Counterinsurgency methods went beyond military support to include
assistance in political development and economic aid. Robbins, Th is Time
We W i n , 22; Summers, On Strategy , 72–73. - Lewis Sorley, A Better War: Th e Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of
America’s Last Years in Vietnam (Orlando, FL: Harvest/Harcourt, 1999), 2. - Summers, On Strategy , 43–44, 72–73. Decker reportedly assured Ken-
nedy that “any good soldier can handle guerillas.” Quoted in Schandler,
America in Vietnam , 31. - Larry Berman, Lyndon Johnson’s War: Th e Road to Stalemate in Vietnam
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1989), 46.