For example, at a November 10, 1965, meeting, Johnson told the chiefs
they were naive and reckless, willing to bring on a world war. Robbins,
Th is Time We Win , 30–31.
Schandler, Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam , 59–61; Langguth, Our Vietnam ,
454–55.
For a full discussion and sharp critique of administration-JCS relations
throughout this period, see H. R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon
Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff , and the Lies that Led
to Vietnam (New York: HarperCollins, 1997).
For example, he argued strongly in early 1967 for permission to extend
ground combat operations into Laos and Cambodia. Langguth, Our
Vietnam , 442.
Th e March–April 1967 discussion of Westmoreland’s request to raise the
1967 troop ceiling from the approved 470,000 to at least 555,000 (he
preferred 670,000) is recounted in Berman, Lyndon Johnson’s War , 34–35.
For postwar criticisms of American strategy in Vietnam, see George C.
Herring, “American Strategy in Vietnam: Th e Postwar Debate,” Military
Aff airs 46 (2) (April 1982): 57–63, esp. 59–60.
Sorley, Better War , 6, 20–21.
Berman, Lyndon Johnson’s War , 54–55.
Sorley, Better War , 15–16.
Hess, Presidential Decisions for War , 113. Th e administration’s fear of Chi-
nese involvement has been questioned, both during the war and later. Of
note, however, notwithstanding American precautions, Beijing still sent
thousands of military specialists to the DRV to assist in air defenses and
engineering. Langguth, Our Vietnam , 374–75. Concern about the Chinese
infl uenced American military leaders, too: among the reasons the JCS
advocated reserve mobilization was a desire to deter Beijing, which was
seen as less likely to send in its forces if it knew that the United States was
prepared to meet them on equal terms. Schandler, Lyndon Johnson and
Vietnam , 34.
Th e possibility that the United States would cut off the Laotian supply
route deeply concerned communist military commanders. See Langguth,
Our Vietnam , 439.
Schandler, Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam , 42.
In summer 1967, when U.S. offi cials pressed a number of Asian allies
to increase their troop commitments, virtually all refused. Th ey were
untroubled by the prospect of a communist victory. Schandler, Lyndon
Johnson and Vietnam , 53–54; Berman, Lyndon Johnson’s War , 56.
