408 notes to pages 239‒243
- Jacobs and Shapiro, “Lyndon Johnson, Vietnam, and Public Opinion,”
600–602; Turner, Lyndon Johnson’s Dual War , 192–93, 208. - Turner, Lyndon Johnson’s Dual War , 164–65, 192–93, 208.
- Historians continue to debate which side could better withstand a
stalemate. Th e more established view holds that a stalemate played into
communist hands because the American commitment was more vulner-
able. Th us Larry Berman claims, “Hanoi could accept the conditions of
a stalemate longer than the United States. Stalemate was tantamount to
victory for Hanoi.” Berman, Lyndon Johnson’s War , 25. On the other hand,
the revisionist school challenges the idea that insurgents win merely by
not losing. See Robbins, Th is Time We Win. Th e response of both sides in
early 1967 suggests deep frustration with the pace of the war, rather than
confi dence it could outlast its adversary. - Berman, Lyndon Johnson’s War , 30–31, 33.
- Robbins, Th is Time We Win , 39.
- For a full account of the debate about the communist order of battle, see
Berman, Lyndon Johnson’s War. - Sorley, Better War , 21.
- Robbins, Th is Time We Win , 37; Berman, Lyndon Johnson’s War , 28–29,
38–39, 49–50, 74–75, 81–83, 110–11. - On the skepticism in the media about the new numbers, see Berman,
Lyndon Johnson’s War , 119. Years later Westmoreland would become
involved in a lawsuit against CBS when a broadcast charged him with
deliberately trying to deceive the president about actual truth strength.
Th e dispute is discussed in detail by Berman, who concludes the
deception was being foisted by the president and most of his senior
offi cials, determined to create an impression of progress in the public
mind. Johnson pressured MACV for evidence of military gains to suit
his political needs at home. Berman, Lyndon Johnson’s War , 111–13. - Berman, Lyndon Johnson’s War , 113–17.
- Robbins, Th is Time We Win , 90.
- Berman, Lyndon Johnson’s War , 119; Robbins, Th is Time We Win , 90.
- Hess, Presidential Decisions for War , 139.
- Robbins, Th is Time We Win , 67–68, 64, 75.
- Giap understood the danger of premature eff orts to launch the third
phase of a Maoist people’s war. In early 1951 he had attempted to infl ict
a decisive defeat on the French in the Red River region of what was then
called Tonkin, the area that included Hanoi and Haiphong. His forces
had suff ered a stinging rebuff at the hands of the French, whose military
assets were best suited to conventional warfare. For a vivid description
of these failed attacks, see Bernard B. Fall, Street without Joy (New York:
Shocken, 1972) , chaps. 2–3. Now the Tet Off ensive advocates proposed
to leave their forces exposed to the fi repower of an even more formidable
adversary.