notes to pages 261‒271 411- Sorley, Better War , chap. 20.
- Abrams clearly understood that Saigon could not aff ord to keep so large an
army in the fi eld indefi nitely with its own resources. Sorley, Better War , 215. - Sorley, Better War , 218–19.
- Sorley, Better War , 276, 335.
- Sorley, Better War , 282.
- Sorley, Better War , 212–13.
- Indeed, as long ago as 1847, Whig opponents of the Mexican War grudgingly
conceded that they had no alternative but to support Democratic President
James K. Polk’s request for additional military appropriations. One Whig
writer stated the political problem bluntly in the party’s leading journal:
“Congress would never refuse to grant anything and everything necessary
or proper for the support and succor of our brave troops, placed without
any fault of their own, in the heart of a distant country, and struggling with
every peril, discomfort and diffi culty.” “Th e Whigs and the War,” American
Review 6 (October 1847): 343 , as quoted in Norman Graebner, “Lessons of
the Mexican War,” Pacifi c Historical Review 47 (August 1978): 325–42. - Berman, No Peace, No Honor , 81.
- Hoff , Nixon Reconsidered , 158.
- Berman, No Peace, No Honor , 262.
- Berman, No Peace, No Honor , 246.
- Berman, No Peace, No Honor , 39–44.
- Langguth, Our Vietnam , 554, 606.
- Berman, No Peace, No Honor , 66, 70, 92–93.
- Hoff , Nixon Reconsidered , 224–27.
- Berman, No Peace, No Honor , 66, 69–70, 80.
- Berman, No Peace, No Honor , chaps. 7–8.
- Berman, No Peace, No Honor , 52, 68.
- Berman, No Peace, No Honor , 112–17.
- Berman, No Peace, No Honor , 164, 171–72, 189ff.
- Berman, No Peace, No Honor , 184–87, 195, 199–202.
- Berman, No Peace, No Honor , 177–79, 241–42, 253.
- Sorley, Better War , 363, 365.
- Berman, No Peace, No Honor , 255–58.
- Sorley, Better War , 364; Berman, No Peace, No Honor , chap. 13.
- Sorley, Better War , 367ff. In response to less American aid, South Vietnam
reduced its military to just under 1 million troops, including paramilitary
forces. Th is total greatly exceeded the estimated 280,000 NVA/VC troops
in South Vietnam in late April 1975. Sorley, Better War , 370; Berman, No
Peace, No Honor , 270. - Hoff , Nixon Reconsidered , 209.
- Ever since the war ended, participants and historians have debated
whether the United States and its Saigon allies might have won the
confl ict. Proponents of the view that the war was winnable tend to