412 notes to pages 271‒273
focus on the military side of the equation, stressing the fact that Ameri-
can forces were never bested in combat and pointing to the improved
eff ectiveness of the ARVN after 1969. See, for example, Sorley, Better War ;
Summers, On Strategy. From this perspective, blame for the ultimate
collapse of South Vietnam rests with some combination of Congress,
for failing to sustain aid to the Th ieu government, and Watergate, which
weakened Nixon to the point that he could not retaliate.
I reject this analysis. As I have explained, Nixon’s key error lay in his
failure to build domestic backing early in his administration for a durable
commitment to support South Vietnam. Whether this was ever possible
may be debated, of course, because it involves a historical counterfactual.
But by the time of the peace agreement in 1973, it was foolish to believe
the United States would punish violations over the long term based on
Nixon’s private pledges.
On the other side, skeptics contend that the war was always unwinnable
by the United States because of the dedication demonstrated by the Viet-
namese communists and the chronic weaknesses of the Saigon government.
See, for example, Schandler, America in Vietnam. I do not question the fi erce
determination shown by the communists. To say they would have persisted
indefi nitely in the face of a permanent commitment by the United States
along the Korean model, however, suggests they were simply unmindful of
the costs of their struggle. Th is ignores evidence of their demoralization at
various points in the war—possibly during the 1967 stalemate, after Tet, and
in the wake of their setbacks in the post-1969 pacifi cation campaign. Th e
pacifi cation gains also refl ected signifi cant reforms undertaken by the Saigon
government that increased its popular support. Th ieu proved to be his own
worst enemy by his refusal to show any faith in his people—fearful they
might reject him, he was unwilling to chance any political opposition.
I conclude that the United States might have achieved a diff erent
outcome in the war had presidents acted diff erently at critical junctures.
But these windows of opportunity (pursuing a diff erent approach to
Westmoreland’s misconceived search-and-destroy method, cultivating
congressional support for a long-term commitment to South Vietnam
rather than launching the 1970 Cambodia incursion) were short-lived.
We also need to remember that in Vietnam, as in every war, both sides
made signifi cant mistakes. Hanoi might have fought a smarter war, too.- Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., Th e Imperial Presidency (Boston: Houghton
Miffl in 1973).
Chapter 5
- Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: Th e Inside
Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York: Pantheon, 2006),
xxxi. See similarly Richard N. Haass, War of Necessity, War of Choice: A