Ricks, Fiasco , 109–10. Although critics blamed Iraqi exiles, especially
Ahmed Chalabi and his Iraqi National Congress, for painting an overly
optimistic portrait of post–Saddam Hussein Iraq for U.S. planners, Rose
is correct when he suggests that this view just gave American leaders the
excuse they sought for walking away from postwar Iraq and any prob-
lems that might arise. Rose, How Wars End , 260. Rumsfeld in particular
showed enthusiasm during the planning process for any scheme that
confi rmed his assumptions about light, rapid military action with no
lingering commitment.
Nora Bensahel, “Mission Not Accomplished: What Went Wrong with
Iraqi Reconstruction,” Journal of Strategic Studies 29 (3) (June 2006):
453–73, at 459.
Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II , 70–71.
Ricks, Fiasco , 64–66, 71–73; James P. Pfi ff ner, “Th e First MBA President:
George W. Bush as a Public Administrator,” Public Administration Review
67 (1) (January 2007): 6–20, at 10 ; Rose, How Wars End , 261–62.
Stephen Benedict Dyson, “‘Stuff Happens’: Donald Rumsfeld and the
Iraq War,” Foreign Policy Analysis 5 (2009): 327–47, at 333–35, 337–38.
Pfi ff ner, “First MBA President,” 10.
Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II , 142–43.
Bensahel, “Mission Not Accomplished,” 455–56; Gordon and Trainor,
Cobra II , 160.
Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II , 151.
Rumsfeld directed Feith to begin postwar planning earlier, back in Sep-
tember 2002, but this does not seem to have been formalized and little
was done until the lagging preparations were called to the attention of the
secretary and the president in late 2002. Woodward, State of Denial , 91,
103.
Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II , 147–50; Ricks, Fiasco , 80.
Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II , 152–55, 159–60; Ricks, Fiasco , 101–2;
Woodward, State of Denial , 124–25.
Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II , 105. As Garner rushed to put together his
group, the bureaucratic pettiness and gamesmanship continued: Rums-
feld insisted that Garner drop several State Department Iraq experts in
favor of less-qualifi ed Defense Department offi cials. Rumsfeld claimed
that the order to exclude State Department offi cials came from Cheney’s
offi ce. Ricks, Fiasco , 102–3; Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II , 159.
Brooks, Shaping Strategy , 248–49.
Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II , 102. Shinseki had expressed his reserva-
tions about the suffi ciency of the force at a meeting with the president
on January 30, 2003. Some internal Army reviews advised an even larger
force of a half million troops. Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II , 101–4. Some
accounts suggest Shinseki intended to make his disagreements with the
Rumsfeld-Franks plan public. Ricks, Fiasco , 96–97.
