Elusive Victories_ The American Presidency at War-Oxford University Press (2012)

418 notes to pages 292‒299

91. Eric Schmitt, “Pentagon Contradicts General on Iraq Occupation Force’s
    Size,” New York Times , February 28, 2003 ; Ricks, Fiasco , 97–98; Gordon
    and Trainor, Cobra II , 102–3.


92. Ricks faults General Franks for failing to connect the invasion plan to
    the larger objectives of the war. Ricks, Fiasco , 115–16. But this responsi-
    bility properly rests at the top, not with the general planning the opera-
    tions. Woodward says Bush refused to crack down on Rumsfeld when he
    refused to cooperate with other principals and agencies. Woodward, State
    of Denial , 109–10.


93. Woodward, State of Denial , 132.


94. Dyson, “‘Stuff Happens,’” 339.


95. For a similar analysis, see Burke, “Condoleezza Rice as NSC Advisor,”
    572–73. On Bush’s leadership style and his reliance on delegation, see
    Pfi ff ner, “First MBA President.”


96. Th e debate on this will likely never be resolved. On the other side, deep
    sectarian divisions might have erupted after the departure of the dictator,
    no matter how many troops were there to preserve order. For a discussion
    of the competing viewpoints, see Rose, How Wars End , 274–76.


97. Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II , 65.


98. George W. Bush, Decision Points (New York: Crown, 2010), 224.


99. Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II , 115.


100. Ricks, Fiasco , 117. Others give slightly lower totals, e.g., Rose says 130,000
     troops. Rose, How Wars End , 246.


101. Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II , 51.


102. Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II , 65–66, 120–21. On the role of overconfi -
     dence in Saddam’s approach, see Dominic D. P. Johnson, Overconfi dence
     and War: Th e Havoc and Glory of Positive Illusions (Cambridge: Harvard
     University Press, 2004), 192, 194–95.


103. Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II , 62, 122.


104. For a detailed account, see Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II.


105. Baath offi cials took their families and money out of the country during
     the invasion and later used the funds to fi nance the insurgency. Ricks,
     Fiasco , 191.


106. Ricks, Fiasco , 134–35; Rose, How Wars End , 238.


107. Soon thereafter another division would be committed, but this corre-
     sponded to withdrawal of one from the invasion force, so there was no
     net increase in troop strength in Iraq. Ricks, Fiasco , 157.


108. Dyson, “‘Stuff Happens,’” 341; Ricks, Fiasco , 136.


109. Ricks, Fiasco , 168.


110. Hess, Presidential Decisions for War , 2nd ed., 264.


111. Kaufmann, “Th reat Infl ation and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas,”
     31–32.


112. Ricks, Fiasco , 144.


113. Ricks, Fiasco , 138–44.