11◼ REMARKS Bloomberg Businessweek November 2, 2020ILLUSTRATION
BY
SHUHUA
XIONG
● Chinais risingin theeyesoftheU.S.
andtheWest.Butin itsownhistorical
perspective,thisis a restoration● ByMichaelSchuman
NoforeignpolicyissuewillplaguethewinneroftheWhite
HousemorethanChina.There’salreadya debateraging
amongChinawatchersoverwhatWashington’snextsteps
shouldbe.Somefavora “reset”totampdowntensionsand
returntomoreconstructivediplomacy.Othersarefearful
ofthatveryresetandarguetheU.S.mustn’tstrayfromthe
hardline.
Thechoicesmadebythenextadministrationwillbe
critical.AstheU.S.strugglestocontainthecoronavirusout-
breakandrestartitseconomy,Chinaappearstobegaining
strength.Itsgrossdomesticproductexpanded4.9%inthe
thirdquarter,anastoundingreboundina worldstillmostly
miredina pandemic-inducedparalysis.(OfficialChinesedata
havetobetakenwithseveralgrainsofsalt,buteconomists
generallyagreetheeconomyis rapidlyonthemend.)Inits
ownforeignpolicy,BeijinghasbarelyflinchedunderU.S.
pressureandinsteadhasbecomemoreassertive—enhancing
itsinfluenceinglobalinstitutionssuchastheWorldHealth
Organization,crushingthepro-democracymovementin
HongKong,turninguptheheatonTaiwan,andbrawling
(literally)withIndiaalongtheirdisputedborder.
ButbeforetheU.S.anditsalliescanmoveforward,they
havetolookbacktofigureouthowtheworldgottothis
pointwithChinainthefirstplace.Theconsensusholdsthat
Washington’spolicyofengagementwasa graveerrorthatcre-
ateda dangerousadversarytotheU.S.anddemocracyitself.
Butthat’scertaintybornofhindsight.
TheWestreallygotChina“wrong”byunderstandingthe
country’sarrivalasa majorpowerwithintheconfinesofits
own—notChina’s—historicalexperience.Becauseofthat,
weintheU.S.andtheWesttalkandthinkaboutChinathe
wrongwayandcraftpoliciesmismatchedtothedeephistor-
icaltrendsshapingtoday’sChinaanditsroleintheworld.
ThekeyistoseethecountryastheChineseseeit and
toplaceChinawithinthecontextofitshistory,notoursin
theWest.Withthat,anotherChinaemergesthatdemandsa
differentsetofpolicies.Withoutthisalteredunderstanding
ofChina,Washingtonpolicymakerswillstruggletocontend
with Beijing and its intensifying challenge to American
global primacy.
The problem starts in high school. Mine, in Clifton, N.J.,
offered the option of U.S. history or U.S. history. We learned
about other parts of the world only when they drifted into the
American narrative. China made an occasional cameo: John
Hay’s Open Door Policy, or Chiang Kai-shek’s World War II
alliance against Japan. A lot of us were probably taught historyina similarmanner—throughtheprismofourownstory.
Prisms,though,distort.ItjustsohappensAmericans
encounteredChinaatoneofthedarkestpointsinitshistory.
China in the 19th and early 20th centuries was politically
decrepit, militarily inept, economically archaic, and, as
Westerners saw it, socially backward. We were left with an
imageofthecountrythatatbestwasanunmodernrealm
ofquaintricepaddiesandsilk-robedmandarins;atworst,a
war-torn basket case drenched in destitution and decay. Sure,
we all know something of China’s glittering past—of bejeweled
emperors, their grand palaces, and the engineering genius of
the Great Wall. But that China is beyond our prism.
ThatskewsthewaywedescribeanddiscussChinatoday.
Wecallitan“emergingmarket,”whichitiswithinthe
boundariesofourownview.Buttwisttheprism,andChinese
poverty is a fairly recent aberration. The country had consis-
tently been one of the world’s largest economies over the past
2,000 years—and still was well into the 19th century. That’s
why Westerners who visited China were awestruck by riches
exceeding anything they’d witnessed in Europe. When the
firstPortugueseseafarersmadetheirwaytoGuangzhouinthe
early16thcentury,theygaspedatsilkflagsaslargeassails.
“Suchis thewealthofthatcountry,”readsonecontemporary
Portuguese account, “such is its vast supply of silk, that they
squander gold leaf and silk on these flags where we use cheap
colors and coarse linen cloth.”
Rather than something startling, China’s growth into the
world’s second-largest economy is a return to the norm. So is
the critical role it plays in modern manufacturing and trade.
We grouse that China has “stolen” our factories and fret over
how much stuff at Target is “Made in China.” Historically,
though, the country had been a major manufacturing cen-
terandpremierexporter,capableofproducingvaluable
goodsona mind-bogglingscale.TheSongdynasty(960-
1279)experienced a near-industrial revolution seven centuries
before England’s. Silk and porcelain, both Chinese inventions,
were among the world’s first truly global consumer products,
the iPhones of their age. Centuries before Vasco da Gama
felt his way to India in 1498, China was the beating heart of
a global economic system, with trade links stretching from
South China, across Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean, to
the Persian Gulf and Red Sea.
We also talk of the “rise of China” as if it’s astonishing
and unique. Yet China has “risen” many times before. One of
the most remarkable features of its history is how frequently
the Chinese were able to rebuild their society into a major
power after periods of decline, political disorder, and inva-
sion. This latest period of weakness, with China subordinated
to the Western world, hasn’t been all that long by the stan-
dards of Chinese history. For the first 300 years of direct and
consistent contact between China and the West—beginning
in the early 16th century—the emperors retained the upper
hand over the seaborne Europeans. It wasn’t until the Qing
dynasty’s defeat by the British in the first Opium War (1839-
42) that the balance of power swung to the West. From