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◼ REMARKS Bloomberg Businessweek November 2, 2020thestandpointofChinesehistory,what’sunusualabout
modernAsiais thedominanceoftheWest,notthereturnof
Chinaasa regionalpowerhouse.
A muchbetterwaytodescribethecountry’s21stcentury
ascentis asa “restoration,”notsounlikethemanyimperial
restorationsofthepast.Thecurrentregime,thoughnota
dynastytoppedbyanemperor(atleastofficially),is rebuild-
ingthetraditionalpillarsofChinesegreatness—economic,
political,military,and(lesssuccessfully)culturally—muchlike
theTang,Song,orMingdynastieshadintheirday.
Thinking of modern China’s growing power as a
restorationforcesa shiftinhowwecontendwithit.Wein
theWestdiscusshowtofitChinaintotheglobalpoliticaland
economicorderwecreated.ButChinawasnevergoingto
becontentbeinga merecogintheWesternmachine.For
muchofitshistory,it satatthecenterofitsownworldorder,
basedona distinctlyChineseformofforeignrelationsand
governedbyChinesediplomaticidealsandpractices,with
rootsdatingbackmorethan2,000years.TheChineserules
ofdiplomacyandtradewerebasedontheatleastceremo-
nialstatureofChinaasa superiorcivilization,perchedat
thetopofa hierarchyofsocieties.Otherkingsandchiefs
hadtodisplaytheirrespectbygivingtributetotheemper-
ors,whothenconsideredthemvassals.Withtheresurgence
ofChinesepoliticalandeconomicclout,Beijingisresur-
rectingsomeofthesetraditionalforeignpolicyprecepts.
PresidentXi’spetproject,theinfrastructure-building “Belt
and Road” initiative, treats its participants as little more than
supplicants to the throne, which can benefit from China’s
bounty only by playing by Beijing’s rules and performing
the proper kowtows.
The first step in dealing with a Chinese restoration is to
accept that China wants to be and most likely will be a global
superpower. The notion that the U.S. can “stop” China is a
nonstarter. Washington can slow things up by withholding
technology and disrupting trade. But the Chinese believe
that, based on their history, they have a right to be a super-
power, and an approach meant to “keep China down,” as
they see it, will generate conflict but few tangible results.
Similarly, efforts to compel China to “play by the rules,” as
in our rules, are almost equally hopeless. The Chinese per-
ceive the Western world order as an imposition on an East
Asia they’d usually dominated, so they’re far more likely to
assert their own rules than follow ours.
A better route is to allow China more diplomatic space in
areas where it doesn’t fundamentally damage U.S. interests.
Washington has fallen into a pattern of contesting Beijing on
everything, which makes the Chinese feel unduly contained.
If Washington stops opposing their initiatives at every turn,
and is occasionally even supportive, the Chinese will sense
they’re getting the respect they deserve, at minimal cost to
U.S. influence. So if Beijing wants to set up its own interna-
tional institutions, as it did with the Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank, just let it. Maybe even join, to sway the
projects from within. Ditto with Belt and Road. If Beijingwants tolose moneyandalienate othergovernments
building uneconomic railways and roads, we should wish
it the best.
Still, today’s China does present a threat. Its history sug-
gests Beijing will expect to be the dominant power in East
Asia (at the very least). That’s too vital a region to concede
toChina,andtheU.S.willneedtoprotectitscoreinterests
there.Besttodosowithdeftdiplomacythroughinternational
organizationsoralliancesratherthanvitriol-filled, one-on-
one slugfests, as the Trump administration has attempted. A
restored Chinese “empire” will likely be too strong, and too
determined, to assert its normal position in Asia to be taken
on alone. For instance, to contain China in the South China
Sea, which the Chinese consider to be almost entirely their
territory, organize the contending parties in Southeast Asia
into a collective and prod Beijing to negotiate. Perhaps coop-
erate with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations as a pos-
sible forum. Working within the World Trade Organization
to influence China, rather than outside of it, is also smarter.
Chinese leaders badly crave international stature and acclaim,
andthatdesirecanbeturnedagainstthemwithinthesebod-
iestoalterChinesepolicy.
Mostofall,a U.S.policythatrecognizesChinesehistory
doesn’t equal a soft one. Washington must still target China’s
bad practices, more carefully but also more forcefully.
Chinese companies and officials with proven records of steal-
ing technology or participating in human-rights abuses, such
as the mass detention of minority Uighurs, should be sanc-
tioned. Duties ought to be slapped on Chinese exports that
are unduly subsidized by the state. When possible, draft pol-
icies to deal with the risks China presents without making
them blatantly anti-China. For example, instead of banning
Chinese apps such as WeChat, devise a broader policy to pro-
tect U.S. privacy and data from all possible foreign threats.
The U.S. should continue to loudly proclaim support for civil
liberties by backing Hong Kong democracy advocates and the
democratic government of Taiwan.
Contestingtheseoutragesarenota fightwith“China,”but
withtheChineseCommunistParty.Thepartyassertsthetwo
areequivalent,buttheyaren’t.Thescholar-statesmenwho
managedimperialChina,steepedinConfucianism,believed
goodgovernmentwasfoundedonbenevolence,notbrutality,
and Chinese history’s most tyrannical rulers were usually
looked upon with scorn by the Confucians. We should fol-
low their lead.
I don’t believe in historical inevitabilities: Just because
China has restored itself to great power status in the past
doesn’t automatically mean it will now. Contemporary China
is still a middle-income country lacking key technologies and
plagued by an artificially aging population; it has a long way
to go to become a global superpower. Yet from a policy stand-
point, it’s wiser to recognize the historical trends propelling
it forward and rejigger the world order to address Chinese
aspirations (though not its autocracy). It won’t be easy. But
neither is denying history. <BW>