CHAPTER VI
SENSATION
We  can best    understand  the problems    of  sensation   and perception  if  we  first
think   of  the existence   of  two great   worlds—the  world   of  physical    nature  without
and the world   of  mind    within. On  the one hand    is  our material    environment,    the
things  we  see and hear    and touch   and taste   and handle; and on  the other   hand    our
consciousness,  the means   by  which   we  come    to  know    this    outer   world   and adjust
ourselves   to  it. These   two worlds  seem    in  a   sense   to  belong  to  and require each
other.  For what    would   be  the meaning or  use of  the physical    world   with    no  mind
to  know    or  use it; and what    would   be  the use of  a   mind    with    nothing to  be  known
or  thought about?
1. HOW WE COME TO KNOW THE EXTERNAL WORLD
There   is  a   marvel  about   our coming  to  know    the external    world   which   we  shall
never   be  able    fully   to  understand. We  have    come    by  this    knowledge   so  gradually
and unconsciously   that    it  now appears to  us  as  commonplace,    and we  take    for
granted many    things  that    it  would   puzzle  us  to  explain.
Knowledge    through     the     Senses.—For     example,    we  say,    "Of     course  I   see
yonder  green   tree:   it  is  about   ten rods    distant."   But why "of course"?    Why should
objects at  a   distance    from    us  and with    no  evident connection  between us  and
them    be  known   to  us  at  all merely  by  turning our eyes    in  their   direction   when
there   is  light?  Why not rather  say with    the blind   son of  Professor   Puiseaux    of
Paris,  who,    when    asked   if  he  would   like    to  be  restored    to  sight,  answered:   "If it
were    not for curiosity   I   would   rather  have    long    arms.   It  seems   to  me  that    my
hands   would   teach   me  better  what    is  passing in  the moon    than    your    eyes    or
telescopes."
We  listen  and then    say,    "Yes,   that    is  a   certain bell    ringing in  the neighboring
village,"   as  if  this    were    the most    simple  thing   in  the world.  But why should  one
piece   of  metal   striking    against another a   mile    or  two away    make    us  aware   that
there   is  a   bell    there   at  all,    let alone   that    it  is  a   certain bell    whose   tone    we
