41 0Chapter 21Napoleon even enhanced some ideas of the revolu-
tionary era. He completed a Jacobin project for the
codification of French laws, producing the Civil Code
(known as the Napoleonic Code) of 1804, then codes
of commercial law (1807) and penal law (1810). The
codes eliminated scores of antiquated laws, perpetuated
much revolutionary legislation, and standardized the
laws. Among the most far-reaching elements of the
codes were detailed laws of private property, which
protected people who had acquired property during the
revolution. The Napoleonic Code was also bluntly pa-
ternalistic, explicitly treating women as subordinates of
men and blocking their emancipation throughout the
nineteenth century.
Napoleon also revived the revolutionary effort to
expand education. A national school system existed,
but only on paper. Napoleon considered the schools,
like the churches and the law, to be instruments of so-
cial stability. “My principle aim,” he said, “is to secure
the means for directing political and moral opinion.”
Thus he provided the widest educational opportunity
in the world, but his schools operated with “military
discipline.”
Napoleon’s greatest accomplishment as the heir of
the French Revolution was to sustain and expand a
democratic meritocracy, often called “the career open
to talent.” In a world still characterized by corporate so-
ciety, the Napoleonic Empire offered great opportuni-
ties for the able, whatever their social origin or religion.
Bright students from poor backgrounds could rise to
the top. No institution provided greater opportunities
than his army, where soldiers could rise rapidly through
the ranks despite humble origins. In one of Napoleon’s
favorite clichés, every soldier had a field marshal’s ba-
ton in his napsack. His closest marshal, Joachim Murat,
was the son of an innkeeper. In an act that would have
been unthinkable under the monarchy, Murat married
Napoleon’s sister Caroline and became king of Naples.
Other marshals were born the sons of a cooper, a
miller, a mason, and a stableboy.
The Napoleonic Wars
Napoleon devoted most of his time to war; he stayed in
France for only one-third of the days in his reign.
When he became First Consul in 1799, France was at
war with the remnants of the Second Coalition. France
still relied on the numerical strength provided by the
levée en masse, but battles were comparatively small.
Napoleon’s victory at Arcola, for example, had matchedtwenty thousand French soldiers against seventeen
thousand Austrians. During the next fifteen years,
Napoleon fought nearly permanent war against Europe.
His armies occupied Madrid, Rome, Vienna, Berlin, and
Moscow. This required the standing conscription of
young Frenchmen, usually for five years. By 1814 he
had drafted 2.6 million men and led more than one mil-
lion of them to their death.
These huge numbers help to explain Napoleon’s
victories. The revolutionary army at Valmy had num-
bered only fifty-nine thousand. By the time of the
Third Coalition (1805–07), Napoleon often sent
100,000 men into a battle, and that number soon
seemed small. Much of his success came from having
the largest army, or from maneuvering until he obtained
numerical superiority. When he had the advantage,
Napoleon was ruthless. The Prussians learned this at
the battle of Jena (1806): A French army of ninety-six
thousand crushed a Prussian force of fifty-three thou-
sand, then pursued them relentlessly. Napoleon lost 5.2
percent of his army while the Prussians lost 47.2 per-
cent. When Napoleon lost such advantages, he began
to lose battles. Numbers alone do not account for
Napoleon’s military reputation, however. His skillful
use of artillery, especially concentrated artillery firing
rapidly (versus the accepted wisdom of conserving am-
munition), won some battles. His use of elite cavalry
units as shock troops to attack infantry won others. But
his military greatness was less a matter of brilliant
strategies than inspired opportunism.
As warfare changed from formal engagements of
small professional armies to the ruthlessness of mass
armies, other changes followed. In 1793 the Austrian
army in the Netherlands had paid rent to Dutch farm-
ers for permission to camp in their fields. Later, the re-
treating Austrians found themselves pushed against the
Rhine River without sufficient money to pay for ferry
service across the river; instead of seizing the ferries,
the Austrians awaited the French and surrendered. In
contrast, Napoleon encountered a different psychology
of war when he invaded Russia in 1812. The Russians
used a “scorched earth” strategy: They burnt the farms
and fields of the Russian peasantry instead of leaving
food supplies for the French.
By 1805 Napoleon faced a Third Coalition of
Britain, Austria, and Russia. He prepared for an invasion
of England until October 1805, when Admiral Horatio
Nelson’s fleet destroyed the French fleet near the Span-
ish coast off Cape Trafalgar, depriving Napoleon of the
naval power needed for an invasion. Napoleon there-
upon marched his army into central Europe and won