204 Chapter 7 National Growing Pains
held in December 1814 and January 1815 to protest
the war and to plan for a convention of the states to
revise the Constitution.
Sentiment in New England had opposed the war
from the beginning. The governor of Massachusetts
titled his annual address in 1813 “On the Present
Unhappy War,” and the General Court went on
record calling the conflict “impolitic, improper, and
unjust.” The Federalist party had been quick to
employ the discontent to revive its fortunes.
Federalist-controlled state administrations refused to
provide militia to aid in the fight and discouraged
individuals and banks from lending money to the
hard-pressed national government. Trade with the
enemy flourished as long as the British fleet did not
crack down on New England ports, and goods flowed
across the Canadian line in as great or greater volume
as during Jefferson’s embargo.
Their attitude toward the war made the
Federalists even more unpopular with the rest of the
country, and this in turn encouraged extremists to
talk of seceding from the Union. After Massachusetts
summoned the meeting of the Hartford Convention,
the fear was widespread that the delegates would pro-
pose a New England Confederacy, thereby striking at
the Union in a moment of great trial.
Luckily for the country, moderate Federalists
controlled the convention. They approved a state-
ment that in the case of “deliberate, dangerous and
palpable infractions of the Constitution” a state has
the right “to interpose its authority” to protect itself.
This concept, similar to that expressed in the
Kentucky and Virginia resolutions by the Republicans
when they were in the minority, was accompanied by
a list of proposed constitutional amendments
designed to weaken the federal government, reduce
Congress’s power to restrict trade, and limit presi-
dents to a single term.
Nothing formally proposed at Hartford was
treasonable, but the proceedings were kept secret,
and rumors of impending secession were rife. In
this atmosphere came the news from Ghent of an
honorable peace. The Federalists had been
denouncing the war and predicting a British tri-
umph; now they were discredited.
The Battle of New Orleans and the End of the War
Still more discrediting to Federalists was the second
event that would not have happened had communica-
tions been more rapid: the Battle of New Orleans.
During the fall of 1814 the British had gathered an
army at Negril Bay in Jamaica, commanded by Major
General Sir Edward Pakenham, brother-in-law of the
Duke of Wellington. Late in November an armada of
sixty ships set out for New Orleans with 11,000 sol-
diers. Instead of sailing directly up from the mouth of
the Mississippi as the Americans expected, Pakenham
approached the city by way of Lake Borgne, to the
east. Proceeding through a maze of swamps and bay-
ous, he advanced close to the city’s gates before being
detected. Early on the afternoon of December 23,
three mud-spattered local planters burst into the
headquarters of General Andrew Jackson, command-
ing the defenses of New Orleans, with the news.
For once in this war of error and incompetence
the United States had the right man in the right place
at the right time. After his Revolutionary War experi-
ences, Jackson had studied law, then moved west, set-
tling in Nashville, Tennessee. He served briefly in
both houses of Congress and was active in Tennessee
affairs. Jackson was a hard man and fierce-tempered,
frequently involved in brawls and duels, but honest
and, by western standards, a good public servant.
When the war broke out, he was named major general
of volunteers. Almost alone among nonprofessional
troops during the conflict, his men won impressive
victories, savagely crushing the Creek Indians in a
series of battles in Alabama.
Jackson’s success was due to his toughness and
determination. Discipline based on fear, respect, and
their awareness of his genuine concern for their well-
being made his individualistic frontier militiamen into
an army. His men called Jackson Old Hickory; the
Indians called him Sharp Knife.
Following these victories, Jackson was assigned
the job of defending the Gulf Coast against the
expected British strike. Although he had misjudged
Pakenham’s destination, he was ready when the news
of the British arrival reached him. “By the Eternal,”
he vowed, “they shall not sleep on our soil.”
“Gentlemen,” he told his staff officers, “the British
are below, we must fight them tonight.”
While the British rested and awaited reinforce-
ments, planning to take the city the next morning,
Jackson rushed up men and guns. At 7:30 PMon
December 23 he attacked, taking the British by sur-
prise. But Pakenham’s veterans rallied quickly, and
the battle was inconclusive. With Redcoats pouring in
from the fleet, Jackson fell back to a point five miles
below New Orleans and dug in.
He chose his position wisely. On his right was the
Mississippi, on his left an impenetrable swamp, to the
front an open field. On the day before Christmas
(while the commissioners in Ghent were signing the
peace treaty), Jackson’s army, which included a segre-
gated unit of free black militiamen, erected an
earthen parapet about ten yards behind a dry canal
bed. Here the Americans would make their stand.