Anglo-American Rapprochement 205
For two weeks Pakenham probed the American
line. Jackson strengthened his defenses daily. At
night, patrols of silent Tennesseans slipped out with
knife and tomahawk to stalk British sentries. They
called this grim business “going hunting.” On
January 8, 1815, Pakenham ordered an all-out frontal
assault. The American position was formidable, but
these were men who had defeated Napoleon. At
dawn, through the lowland mists, the Redcoats
moved forward with fixed bayonets. Pakenham
assumed that the undisciplined Americans—about
4,500 strong—would run at the sight of bare steel.
The Americans did not run. Perhaps they feared
the wrath of their commander more than enemy bay-
onets. Artillery raked the advancing British, and
when the range closed to about 150 yards, the rifle-
men opened up. Jackson had formed his men in
three ranks behind the parapet. One rank fired, then
stepped down as another took its place. By the time
the third had loosed its volley, the first had reloaded
and was ready to fire again. Nothing could stand
against this rain of lead. General Pakenham was
wounded twice, then killed by a shell fragment while
calling up his last reserves. During the battle a single
brave British officer reached the top of the parapet.
When retreat was finally sounded, the British had
suffered almost 2,100 casualties, including nearly
300 killed. Thirteen Americans lost their lives, and
fifty-eight more were wounded or missing.
Word of Jackson’s magnificent triumph reached
Washington almost simultaneously with the good
news from Ghent. People found
it easy to confuse the chronol-
ogy and consider the war a vic-
tory won on the battlefield
below New Orleans instead of
the standoff it had been. Jackson
became the “Hero of New
Orleans”; his proud fellow citi-
zens rated his military abilities
superior to those of the Duke of
Wellington. The nation rejoiced.
One sour Republican com-
plained that the Federalists of
Massachusetts had fired off
more powder and wounded
more men celebrating the vic-
tory than they had during the
whole course of the conflict.
The Senate ratified the peace
treaty unanimously, and the
frustrations and failures of the
past few years were forgotten.
Moreover, American success in
holding off Great Britain despite
internal frictions went a long way toward convincing
European nations that both the United States and its
republican form of government were here to stay. The
powers might accept these truths with less pleasure
than the Americans, but accept them they did.
The nation had suffered relatively few casualties
and little economic loss, except to the shipping inter-
ests. The Indians were the main losers in the contest.
When Jackson defeated the Creeks, for example, he
forced them to surrender 23 million acres, constitut-
ing three-fifths of what is now Alabama and one-fifth
of Georgia.
Anglo-American Rapprochement
There remained a few matters to straighten out with
Great Britain, Spain, and Europe generally. Since no
territory had changed hands at Ghent, neither signa-
tory had reason to harbor a grudge. For years no seri-
ous trouble marred Anglo-American relations. The
war had taught the British to respect Americans, if
not to love them.
In this atmosphere the two countries worked out
peaceful solutions to a number of old problems.
American trade was becoming ever more important
to the British, that of the sugar islands less so. In July
1815 they therefore signed a commercial convention
ending discriminatory duties and making other
adjustments favorable to trade. Boundary difficulties
also moved toward resolution. At Ghent the diplo-
mats had created several joint commissions to settle
General Andrew Jackson, on the horse, exhorts his men to throw back the advancing British; they
succeed, and Jackson becomes a war hero.