408 • 20 THE GULF WAR AND THE PEACE PROCESSyear, the Palestine National Council voted to declare an independent "State
of Palestine," which soon won diplomatic recognition from a hundred
other countries. Chairman Yasir Arafat publicly denounced terrorism and
offered to recognize Israel, to the dismay of some Palestinian revolutionar¬
ies, in order to open negotiations with Washington. The Israelis vehemently
rejected any idea that the PLO might be treated as a government-in-exile,
let alone as a suitable negotiating partner, but many other people and coun¬
tries argued that the only way to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict was
through a "two-state solution" with a Jewish Israel and an Arab Palestine.
Many Palestinians likewise opposed efforts to make peace with Israel; their
violent acts soon derailed any rapprochement between the Bush adminis¬
tration and the PLO. The uprising continued, as Hamas coordinated attacks
in Gaza and later on the West Bank. As Hamas acquired firearms and resis¬
ted the Israelis, violence intensified throughout the occupied territories.
The End of Lebanon's Civil War
After the West had pulled out its troops in 1984, the government almost
closed down in Beirut. No police remained to stop the abduction of US,
European, and indeed Saudi and even Iranian hostages by the various mili¬
tias. Partitioned, de facto, since 1976, Lebanon saw less fighting between
Muslims and Christians than before 1984, but more within each religious
or political grouping. As soon as one faction seemed ready to take charge
and restore order, it would split into two or more competing splinter
groups. The Shi'i Muslims fought the Palestinians in 1985; by 1988 they
were fighting among themselves, with the somewhat secular and Syrian-
backed Amal pitted against the militantly Islamic Hizballah, supported by
Iran. Only diplomatic intervention by these two outside sponsors ended
the intra-Shi'i quarrel. Meanwhile, the Maronites, who had lost their plu¬
rality of Lebanon's population to the Shi'i Muslims by 1980, could not
agree on a leader. When Amin Jumayyil's presidential term drew to a close
in the summer of 1988, the parliament could not meet in Beirut to elect his
successor because the militias prevented many members from attending.
The presence of 40,000 Syrian troops enabled Damascus to determine
Lebanon's next president, but the loudest voice for the Maronites was Iraqi-
backed General Michel Awn, who demanded that all Syrians leave Lebanon
and even moved into the presidential palace, opposing a pro-Syrian care¬
taker government under Sunni Prime Minister Salim al-Hoss.
In October 1989, after a year-long impasse, the Saudi government invited
all surviving members of Lebanon's parliament (no popular election of
deputies had taken place since 1972) to Taif to choose a new president. The