Palestinians and the Peace Process ••• 409man whom they elected, a moderate Christian acceptable to Syria, was as¬
sassinated after only seventeen days in power, but the parliament bravely
met again to elect a replacement, Ilyas Harawi. The Awn and Harawi Ma¬
ronite factions fought each other as bitterly in 1990 as the Shi'i groups had
among themselves in 1988. Only when Iraq became embroiled in occupy¬
ing Kuwait did it withdraw its support from Awn. He was soon defeated by
Harawi's forces, backed by Syria, whose troops remained in Lebanon until
2005, while the people slowly rebuilt their country. Lebanon and Syria
signed a pact in May 1991, giving Damascus substantial control over Leb¬
anon's foreign and military affairs. The 1989 Taif Accords proposed a divi¬
sion of power among Lebanon's sects, factions, and militias that matched
(better than before) their actual shares of the country's population. With
Lebanon finally at peace, Beirut and most of the countryside returned to
normal. Israel's troops, which had pulled back in 1985 to a "security zone"
on the Lebanese side of its northern border, withdrew completely in 2000.
Hizballah's resistance had triumphed.The Peace Process in Arab-Israeli Relations
The Gulf War changed Israel's relationship with its Arab neighbors and
with the Palestinians. For one thing, the USSR altered its Middle East pol¬
icy. Gorbachev's government did not oppose the US-led coalition. It al¬
lowed its Jewish citizens to emigrate and resumed diplomatic relations with
Israel, resulting in the influx of almost a million Soviet Jews. It stopped
arming Syria and other Arab confrontation states against Israel and Egypt.
It aided US efforts to convene a general peace conference. Then it dissolved
as a union at the end of 1991, leaving the US as the sole superpower that
could act independently in the Middle East. If Israel's government could
trust Washington to uphold its essential interests, it could be persuaded to
enter peace talks with Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan (with an attached
delegation of Palestinians, of whom none were publicly tied to the PLO).
The oil-exporting Arab governments realized that their security depended
on good relations with Washington and on averting any future threat to
their security—a threat more apt to come from Iraq or Iran than from Is¬
rael. Syria was willing to enter peace talks if it stood a chance to regain the
Golan Heights taken by Israel in the 1967 war. Besides, the loss of its Soviet
sponsor left Syria with few real alternatives. For Jordan and the PLO, their
public support of Iraq's policies had hurt their credibility among the oil-
exporting regimes that had formerly backed them financially and diplo¬
matically. Both had suffered losses from the Gulf War. Long willing to enter
reasonable talks with Israel, they confirmed their readiness to negotiate.