Hellenistic Philosophy Introductory

Ethics 213
between good things and bad things, saying that the indifferent is con-
ceived of in two ways: in one way it is what is neither good nor bad nor
worth choosing nor worth avoiding; in the other it is what is stimulative
of impulse neither towards nor away from [itself]. In this sense some are
said to be absolutely indifferent, such as <having an odd or even number
of hairs on one's head, or> extending one's finger this way or that way,
or to picking off some annoying object, such as a twig or a leaf. In the
first sense one must say that, according to the members of this school,
what is between virtue and vice is indifferent, but not [indifferent] with
respect to selection and rejection; and that is why some have selective
value, and some have rejective disvalue, but make no contribution at all
to the happy life.
7a. And some are natural, some unnatural and some neither unnatural
nor natural. Natural, then, are such things: health, strength, soundness
of one's sense organs, and things like this. Unnatural are such things:
disease, weakness, impairment and such things. Neither unnatural nor
natural are: a stable condition of soul and body according to which the
one is receptive of false presentations and the other receptive of wounds
and impairments; and things like these. They say that the account of
these matters is based on the primary natural and unnatural things. For
what makes a difference and the indifferent are relative. That is why,
they say, even if we say that bodily matters and external things are
indifferent, we [also] say that they are indifferent with respect to living
a beautifully ordered life (and in this consists a happy life), but not, by
Zeus, [indifferent] with respect to being in a natural state nor with respect
to impulse towards or away from [something].
7b. Again, of indifferent things, some have more value and others
have less; and some are [valuable] in themselves and some instrumentally;
and some are preferred and some are rejected, and some neither. Preferred
are all things indifferent which have a lot of value as indifferents; rejected
are all things indifferent which have a lot of disvalue, in the same sense;
neither preferred nor indifferent are all which have neither a lot of value
nor a lot of disvalue.
Of preferred things, some are in the soul, some in the body, and some
external. In the soul are things like this: natural ability, [moral] progress,
good memory, mental sharpness, a condition which enables one to stand
firm in appropriate actions, and the crafts which can contribute substan-
tially to the natural life. Preferred things in the body are health, good
sense-perception, and things like these. Among externals are parents,
children, possessions in due measure, acceptance among men.
The opposites of those mentioned are rejected things in the soul;
[rejected things] in the body and externally are those which are similarly