Hellenistic Philosophy Introductory

(Marvins-Underground-K-12) #1
Ethics 217
9b. All impulses are [acts of] assent; <there are other kinds of
assent>,^45 but the practical ones also include the power to set [the agent]
in motion. Now, [acts of] assent are directed at one thing and impulses
at another; and [acts of] assent are directed at certain propositions, while
impulses are directed at predicates which are, in a way, included in the
propositions to which assent is given.
Since passion is a form of impulse, let us speak next about the passions.


  1. They say that a passion is an impulse which is excessive and
    disobedient to the reason which constrains, or an , unnatural
    motion of the soul (and all passions belong to the leading part of the
    soul). And that is why every 'flutter' is a passion again
    passion is a 'flutter'. Since this is what a passion is like, one must suppose
    that some are primary and principal, and the others are referred to these.
    The primary are these four kinds: desire, fear, pain, and pleasure. Desire
    and fear, then, are principal, one [being concerned with] the apparent
    good, the other with the apparent bad. Pleasure and pain supervene on
    these, pleasure when we achieve what we desired or escape what we were
    afraid of; pain when we miss achieving what we desired or meet with
    what we were afraid of. With all the passions of the soul, since they say
    that they are opinions, the [word] opinion is used instead of 'weak
    supposition', and 'fresh' is used instead of 'what stimulates irrational
    contraction elation'.
    lOa. The terms 'irrational' and 'unnatural' are not used in their com-
    mon senses, but 'irrational' means the same as 'disobedient to reason'.
    For every passion is violent, since those who are in a state of passion
    often see that it is advantageous not to do this, but are swept away by
    the vehemence [of the passion], as though by some disobedient horse,
    and are drawn to doing it; in this connection people often concede [that
    this is going on] when they cite that familiar tag:^46 "Nature compels me,
    though I am aware [of what I am doing]". For he here calls the realization
    and consciousness of what is right "awareness". And the term 'unnatural'
    was used in the outline [definition] of passion, since it is something which
    happens contrary to the right and natural reason. Everyone in a state of
    passion turns his back on reason, not like those who are deceived on
    some point or other, but in a special sense. For those who are deceived,
    about atoms being principles for instance, when they are taught that they
    do not exist, then abandon their belief. But those who are in a state of
    passion, even if they do learn and are taught that one should not suffer

  2. For the suggested supplement see B. Inwood, Ethics and Action in EarlJ' Stoicism (Oxford



  1. pp. 287-288 n. 271.



  1. Euripides fr. 837 Nauck.

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