Sextus Empiricus: General Principles 319
investigated first and then grasped, but if they want to take the investiga-
tion as their starting point, we bring them to see that what is going to
be investigated must be grasped before it can be investigated. Conse-
quently, for these reasons they can neither grasp any of the non-evident
things nor pronounce about them in such a way as to commit themselves
to it. The immediate result of this will, I think, be that the argumentative
ingenuity of the dogmatists is abolished and the suspensive philosophy
is introduced.
- But if they say that they do not mean that it is this sort of grasp
which ought to precede the investigation, but just a simple conception,
then it is not impossible for those who suspend judgement to investigate
the existence of non-evident things. For the sceptic is not, in my view,
barred from having a conception, since this occurs on the basis of clear
appearances which strike him and about which he is passive and also
since the conception does not necessarily entail the existence of the things
conceived of. For, as they say, we conceive not only existent things but
non-existent things as well. Hence the suspensive man remains in the
sceptical disposition both when he investigates and when he conceives;
for it has been shown that he assents to what strikes him in a passive
presentation, in so far as it is apparent to him. - But consider whether even here the dogmatists are not barred from
investigation. For continued investigation of things is not inconsistent
for those who admit that they are ignorant about what things are like in
their nature, but it is for those who think that they know them with
precision. For the one group is, as they have supposed, already near the
end of its investigation, while the other still possesses the key starting
point of every investigation, viz. the belief that they have not discovered
[the truth]. - Therefore, we must for the present investigate summarily each
part of what they call philosophy; and since there has been a great deal
of disagreement among the dogmatists about the parts of philosophy,
some saying that there is only one, some two and some three, though it
would not be appropriate to prolong our consideration of this now, let
us get on with the argument, even-handedly setting out the opinion of
those who seem to have dealt with it rather completely.
Sextus PH 2.14-21 [III-32]
Ch. iii On the Criterion
- Let us first say that [the word] 'criterion' is applied both to that
with reference to which we make judgements of existence and nonexist-
ence, and to that with attention to which we live. Our present purpose