320 ///-32 to ///-33
is to examine the so-called criterion of truth. For we have discussed the
other sense of criterion in our discussion of scepticism.- The criterion, then, which we are discussing has three senses:
general, particular and most particular. In the general sense it is every
standard for grasping, in which sense physical [organs] such as vision
are called criteria; in the particular sense it is every technical standard
for grasping, for example a yardstick and a compass; in the most particular
sense it is every technical standard for grasping a non-evident thing, and
in this sense things drawn from daily life are not said to be criteria, but
only logical apparatus, i.e., what the dogmatists bring to bear on a decision
about the truth [are said to be criteria]. 16. So we say that we will first
undertake a preliminary discussion of the logical criterion. But the logical
criterion too has three senses, that by whom, and that by means of which,
and that according to which. An example of 'by whom' is man, of 'by
means of which' is either sense-perception or intellect, and of 'that
according to which' is the application of the presentation; for it is accord-
ing to [the presentation] that a man sets himself to judge by means of
one of the above-mentioned [criteria]. - It is, then, perhaps fitting to say this by way of introduction, so
that we form a conception of the subject of our discussion. But let us
move on to the counter-argument used against those who rashly say that
they have grasped the criterion of truth, beginning with the [fact of]
disagreement about it.
Ch. iv Does a Criterion of Truth Exist? - Some of those who have discussed the criterion have pronounced
that it exists, such as the Stoics and certain others; while some have said
that it does not, in particular Xeniades of Corinth and Xenophanes of
Colophon, who says:^28
and seeming is wrought upon all things.But we have suspended judgement as to whether it exists or does not.
- So, they will say either that this disagreement is decidable or undecid-
able; and if it is undecidable, they will be immediately granting that one
ought to suspend judgement, while if it is decidable, let them tell us by
what it will be decided, when we do not even have an agreed upon
criterion [to follow], in general do not even know whether it exists but
are, rather, investigating [this question]. 20. Moreover, in order to decide
about the disagreement which arose concerning the criterion we must - B 34.5.