Sextus Empiricus: The Modes 331
example their fantastical wise man, we take up the mode which is third
in order.
[3] We say that this mode is based on the differences among the senses.
That the senses differ from each other is self-evident. 92. Pictures, at
any rate, seem to the eyes to have recesses and projections, but not to
the touch. And honey appears pleasant to the tongue in some cases, but
unpleasant to the eyes. So it is impossible to say whether it is, all on its
own, pleasant or unpleasant. The same applies to oil. For it pleases the
sense of smell but displeases taste. 93 .... Therefore we shall not be able
to say what each of these is like in its nature, but it will on each occasion
be possible to say how it appears.
- Many more examples than these could be given, but to avoid delay
and in view of the purpose of our treatise the following should be said.
Each of the sensibles which appears to us seems to strike us as varied.
For example, the apple is smooth, sweet and yellow. So it is non-evident
whether on a given occasion it really has just these qualities, or whether
it has just one quality and only appears different because of the differing
construction of the sense organs, or whether it has more qualities than
the ones which appear but some of them do not strike us .... - But, someone shall say, nature made our sense organs commensu-
rate with the sensibles. What sort of nature [is he talking about], when
there is so much undecidable disagreement about its existence? For he
who is deciding on this very point, i.e., whether nature exists, is either
a layman, in which case he shall not, according to them, be trustworthy;
or he is a philosopher, in which case he is a party to the disagreement
and himself not a judge but one subject to judgement. 99. But if it is
possible that only those qualities exist in the apple which we seem to
grasp, and that there are more than these or again that not even those
which strike us [actually] exist, then it shall be non-evident to us what
the apple is like. And the same argument applies to the other sensibles.
If, however, the senses do not grasp external objects, then neither shall
the intellect be able to grasp them, so that by this argument too it seems
that we shall conclude to suspension of judgement about external objects. - [4] In order to apply the argument also to each sense [by itself]
or even to set the [argument from the] senses aside, and still be able to
end up with suspension of judgement, let us bring in the fourth mode
for it too. This is the one termed 'circumstantial', and we say that the
dispositions are circumstances. We say that this mode is seen [to operate]
with natural or unnatural states, with being awake or asleep, with ages,
with being in motion or rest, with hate or love, with being in need or
sated, with being drunk or sober, with predispositions, with boldness or
fear, with feeling pleasure or pain. 101. For example, things strike us