332 l//-35
differently depending on whether we are in a natural or unnatural state,
since madmen and those possessed by the gods seem to hear the voices
of daimons, but we do not. Similarly, they often say that they are aware
of an aroma of storax or frankincense or some such thing and many other
things, when we do not perceive it. And the same water seems to be
boiling when poured onto feverish spots, but is [only] lukewarm to us.
... 102. And if someone should say that a conjunction of certain humours
causes uncongenial presentations to come from the objects to those who
are in an unnatural state, then one should say that since even the healthy
have a blend of humours, these are able to make the external objects,
although they are by nature such as they appear to be to those who are
said to be in an unnatural state, appear different to those who are healthy.
103. For it is a mere whim to give to one set of humours and not to
others the power to change external objects, since just as even those who
are healthy are in the state natural to the healthy, but unnatural to those
who are ill, so too those who are ill are in the state which is unnatural
to the healthy but natural to the ill. Consequently, one must have confi-
dence in them too, since they are in a natural state relative to something.
104. Presentations become different because of being asleep or awake,
since we do not receive the same presentations when awake that we do
while asleep; nor do we receive the same presentations while asleep
that we do while awake. Thus the existence or non-existence of the
presentations is not unqualified but relative. For it is relative to sleep or
to waking. It is likely, then, that we see while sleeping those things which
are non-existent in [regard to] waking, but not absolutely non-existent;
for they exist in sleep, just as things seen while awake also exist even if
they do not exist in sleep ....
112. Since there is so much inconsistency in our dispositions, and
since men are in different dispositions at different times, perhaps it is
easy to say how each of the external objects appears to each man, but
no longer [easy] to say what it is [really] like, since the inconsistency is
undecidable. For he who is deciding is either in some of the above-
mentioned dispositions or he is not in any disposition at all. But to say
that he is not in any disposition whatsoever, for example, that is neither
healthy nor sick, neither moving nor at rest, nor of any particular age,
and that he is free of the other dispositions, is totally implausible. But
if he is going to judge the presentations while in some disposition, then
he will be a party to the disagreement ...
114. Further, the inconsistency among such presentations is undecid-
able in another way. For he who prefers one presentation over another
and of one circumstance over another, does so either without judging
and without a demonstration or by judging and with a demonstration.