Sextus Empiricus: The Modes 337
procedure [of ordinary life] or this law or this custom (and so for each
of the others). Therefore by this mode too it is necessary for us to suspend
judgement about the nature of things.
In this way, then, we wind up at suspension of judgement by means
of the ten modes.
Sextus PH 1.164-177 [III-36]
Ch. xv The Five Modes
- The later sceptics offer these five modes of suspension of judge-
ment: the first is based on disagreement; the second is the one forcing
an infinite regress; the third is the one based on relativity; the fourth is
the hypothetical one; the fifth is the one based on circular reasoning.
- [1] The mode based on disagreement is that according to which
we discover an undecidable dispute occurring for any matter proposed,
both in ordinary life and among philosophers, as a result of which we
are not able to choose something or to reject it, and so we arrive at
suspension of judgement.
- [2] The mode based on infinite regress is that in which we say
that what is offered as confirmation of the matter proposed is itself in
need of confirmation, and so on infinitely, so that not having a starting
point from which we can begin to establish anything, suspension of
judgement follows.
- [3] The mode based on relativity, as we said previously [1.135-6],
is that in which the object appears to be of one sort or another in relation
to what is judging it and to the things observed along with it, but as for
its nature, we suspend judgement.
- [4] The mode based on hypothesis is used when the dogmatists,
being forced into an infinite regress, take as a starting point that which
they do not establish, but rather think deserves to be taken as agreed
upon simply and without demonstration.
- [5] The mode of circular reasoning is introduced whenever that
which ought to provide assurance for the thing investigated itself requires
confirmation from the thing investigated. Therefore, we are not able
to accept either one as establishing the other, and regarding both we
suspend judgement.
We shall show briefly in the following way that every thing investigated
can be referred to these modes. 170. That which is proposed is either
sensible or intelligible, but whichever it is, it is a subject of disagreement.
For some say that only sensibles are true; others say that only intelligibles
are true; still others say that some sensibles and some intelligibles are
true. Will these say that the disagreement is decidable or not? If they
