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say it is undecidable, we hold that it is necessary to suspend judgement,
for, regarding undecidable disagreements, it is not possible to make
pronouncements. If they say it is decidable, we ask on what basis it will
be decided? 171. For example, in the case of the sensible object (we shall
base our argument on this first), is it decided by a sensible or an intelligi-
ble? If by a sensible, since we are investigating sensibles, that will require
something else for its confirmation. And if that will be another sensible,
again, it will require something else for its confirmation, and this will go
on to infinity. 172. But if the sensible will need to be decided by an
intelligible, since intelligibles are subjects of disagreement, then this will
need judgement and confirmation, since it is an intelligible. On what
basis will it be confirmed? If by an intelligible, there will occur a similar
infinite regress; if by a sensible, since an intelligible was adduced as
confirmation of a sensible and the sensible as confirmation of an intelligi-
ble, the mode of circular reasoning will be introduced.
- If, avoiding these [consequences], our interlocutor should take as
granted and think proper to assume without demonstration something
for the demonstration of the next stages of his argument, the hypothetical
mode is introduced and an impasse [aporia] ensues. For if the one who
lays down the hypothesis is himself trustworthy, we shall always be no
less trustworthy when we lay down an opposite hypothesis. And if the
one who lays down the hypothesis hypothesizes something true, he casts
suspicion on it, since he assumes it according to his hypothesis, but
does so without establishing it. If he hypothesizes something false, the
foundation for the things to be established is unsound. 174. And if
hypothesizing something contributes something towards confirmation,
then one might as well hypothesize the conclusion, and not something
else on the basis of which the conclusion of the argument is to be
established. And if it is absurd to hypothesize that which is investigated,
it will also be absurd to hypothesize that upon which it depends. - That all sensibles are relative is evident, for they are relative to
those sensing them. So, it is clear that whatever sensible thing is proposed
to us, it is easy to refer it to the five modes. We reason similarly about
the intelligible. For if it would be said that it is a matter of undecidable
disagreement, it will be conceded to us that one should suspend judgement
regarding it. 176. But if the disagreement will be decidable, if it is
decidable by means of an intelligible, we fall into an infinite regress, but
if it is decidable by means of a sensible, we fall into circular reasoning.
For the sensible is again subject to disagreement, and not being able to
decide on the basis of it, because of an infinite regress, it will need an
intelligible just as the intelligible is in need of a sensible. 177. For these
reasons, one who assumes anything on the basis of an hypothesis will be