Sextus Empiricus: Logic 343
that the existence of the intellect is graspable. For since Gorgias, in
saying that nothing exists, is saying that intellect too does not exist,
whereas some have pronounced that it does exist, how will they decide
the disagreement? For it is neither by means of intellect, since they will
be seizing upon that which is under investigation, nor by means of
anything else. For they say that there is nothing else, according to the
present hypothesis, by means of which matters are judged. So, whether
intellect exists or not is undecidable and ungraspable, to which is added
the conclusion that we ought not to attend to the intellect alone in the
judgement of these matters, it having not yet been grasped.
- But let us grant that the intellect is grasped and let us agree to
the hypothesis that it exists. I still say that it is not able to judge matters.
For if it does not accurately perceive itself, but rather is in disagreement
[with itself] about its own being and the manner of its coming to be and
of its location, how would it be able to grasp accurately anything else?
- And if it is granted that the intellect is capable of judging matters,
we will not find out how we are to judge matters according to it. For
since there is a great difference among intellects, seeing that the intellect
of Gorgias is one thing, according to which he says that nothing exists,
and the intellect of Heraclitus another, according to which he says that
all things exist, and still different is the intellect of those who say that
some things exist and others do not, we shall not be in a position to
decide regarding the differences among intellects, nor shall we be able
to say that it is appropriate to follow the intellect of one man and not
that of another. 60. For should we dare to decide by following one person's
intellect, we shall be seizing upon that which is under investigation by
assenting to one side of the disagreement. And should we dare to decide
by means of some other thing, we shall be false to the assumption that
it is by means of intellect alone that one ought to judge matters.
- Further, we shall be able to show, from what we said of the criterion
called 'by whom,' that we are not able to discover which intellect is more
clever than the others; and [we shall also be able to show] that if we do
discover an intellect more clever than all those that have come into being
and exist now, since it is non-evident whether there will be another more
clever than this one, one ought not to attend to [the former]; 62. and
that even if we hypothesize an intellect than which there could be none
smarter, we shall not assent to him who judges by means of it, being
wary that in advancing some false argument he can persuade us of its
truth, because of the sharpness of his intellect. Therefore, one ought not
to try to judge matters by the intellect alone.
- The remaining possibility is that we should judge matters by means
of both [sense-perception and intellect]. But again this is impossible. For
