344 l//-38
not only do the senses not lead the intellect to grasping, but they are
even inimical to it. It is surely the case, at least, that Democritus said
that from the fact that honey appears bitter to some person and sweet
to another, the honey itself is neither bitter nor sweet, whereas Heraclitus
said it was both. The same line of reasoning applies to the other senses
and the other sensibles. Thus, the intellect, basing itself on the senses,
is compelled to pronounce differing and conflicting things. But this is
alien to a graspable criterion.
- In addition, this should be said. People will judge matters either
by means of all the senses and the intellects of everyone or by some. But
if someone will say that it is by means of all, he will be endorsing
impossibilities, given that there is so much obvious conflict in the senses
and in the intellects. Moreover, the argument will be overturned, given
the pronouncement of Gorgias' intellect that one ought not to attend
either to sense-perception or to intellect. But if they say that it is by
means of some, how will they judge that one ought to attend to these
senses and this intellect and not to those, not having an agreed upon
criterion by means of which they will decide among the differing senses
and intellects. 65. And if they should say that we should judge the
differences among the senses and the intellects by means of the intellect
and the senses, they are seizing upon that which is under investigation.
For we are investigating whether it is possible to judge by means of these. - Further, it should be said that someone will judge sense-perceptions
and intellects by means of the senses, or the sense-perceptions and intel-
lects by means of the intellects, or the sense-perceptions by means of
the senses and intellects by means of the intellects, or the intellects by
means of the senses and the sense-perceptions by means of the intellect.
If, therefore, they should desire to judge both by means of the senses or
the intellect, they are no longer judging by means of the senses and the
intellect, but only by means of one of these, whichever they should
choose. And the aforementioned problems will follow upon them. 67. If,
however, they decide regarding the sense-perceptions by means of the
senses and the intellects by means of the intellect, then since sense-
perceptions conflict with sense-perceptions and intellects with intellects,
whichever of the conflicting sense-perceptions they will use for the judge-
ment of the others, they will be seizing upon the matter under investiga-
tion. For they will be taking one side of the disagreement as trustworthy
for the decision of those that are equally under investigation with it. 68.
The same argument applies to the intellects. And if they decide regarding
the intellects by means of the senses and regarding the senses by means
of the intellect, the mode based on circular reasoning is adduced; accord-
ing to this [mode], in order that the sense-perception should be decided