346 l/1-38 to /l/-39
- But one cannot even say that the soul grasps the externally existing
objects by means of the states of the senses, on the basis of the similarity
of these states to the externally existing objects. For on what basis will
the intellect know if the states of the senses are similar to the sensibles
when it has not encountered the external objects themselves and the
senses do not reveal to it the nature of the sensibles but only their own
states, as I argued on the basis of the modes leading to suspension of
judgement^33 75. For just as someone who, not being acquainted with
Socrates, and seeing a picture of him, does not know if the picture
resembles Socrates, so, the intellect, when it observes the states of the
senses, but does not see the external objects, will not know if the states
of the senses resemble the external objects. So, it will not be able to
judge these according to the presentation on the basis of similarity. - But let us grant as a concession that in addition to being conceived
and grasped, the presentation admits of having matters judged according
to it, even though our reasoning suggested entirely the opposite. And so
either we shall have confidence in every presentation <and we shall decide
on the basis of it, or on the basis of some [one] presentation. But if we
have confidence in every presentation, it is clear that we shall have
confidence in the presentation of Xeniades>^34 according to which he says
that all presentations are untrustworthy, and the argument will be turned
around into holding that it is not the case that all presentations are such
that we are able to judge matters according to them. 77. But if we have
confidence [only] in some, how shall we decide that it is appropriate to
have confidence in these presentations and not those? For if this decision
is made without a presentation, they will be granting that the presentation
is superfluous for judging, since they will actually be saying that we are
able to judge matters apart from it. But if the decision is made with a
presentation, how will they grasp the presentation which they are bringing
forward for the judgement of the other presentations? 78. Or again, they
will need another presentation for its judgement, and a third for the
second, [and so on] to infinity. But it is impossible to make an infinite
number of decisions. So, it is impossible to discover what sorts of presen-
tations ought to be used as criteria and what sorts should not. Since,
therefore, even if we grant that one ought to judge matters on the basis
of presentations, whether having confidence in all as criteria or only in
some, the argument is overturned in either case, and the conclusion must
be that presentations ought not to be brought forward as criteria for the
judgement of matters. - III-35 (100 ff.).
- III-32 (18).