Sextus Empiricus: Logic 345
on we shall have to express a prior preference regarding the intellects,
and in order that the intellects should be tested, it will be necessary for
the senses to be tested first. 69. Since, therefore, like criteria cannot be
decided upon by like, nor can both types [be decided on] by one, nor,
interchanging them, can each [be decided on] by the other type, we shall
not be in a position to prefer one intellect over another or one sense-
perception over another. And for this reason, we shall have nothing by
means of which we are able to judge. For if we shall not be able to judge
by all the sense-perceptions and all the intellects, we shall not know
which ones one ought to judge by and which ones not, and we shall have
nothing by means of which we shall judge matters. And so, for these
reasons, the criterion 'by means of which' would be unreal
Ch. vii Concerning the Criterion 'According to Which'
- Let us consider next the criterion 'according to which' they say
matters are to be judged. First, therefore, there is this to say about it,
namely, that the presentation is inconceivable. For they say that the
presentation is an impression in the leading part of the soul. Since,
therefore, the soul and its leading part are pneuma or something more
subtle than pneuma, as they say, someone will not be able to conceive of
an impression in it either in terms of depressions and elevations, as we
see in the case of wax seals, or in terms of their fantastic 'alteration'. For
no one could retain the memory of all theoretical propositions which
constitute a craft, since the previously existing [alterations] are wiped
out by the subsequent alterations. Even if, however, the presentation
were able to be conceived, it would be ungraspable. 71. For, since it is
a state of the leading part of the soul, and its leading part is not grasped,
as we have shown, we shall not be able to grasp its state either. - Further, even if we were to grant that the presentation is grasped,
it will not be possible to judge matters according to it. For the intellect,
as they say, does not apply itself to external objects and have them
presented to it through itself, but rather by means of sense-perceptions;
and the senses do not grasp externally existing objects, but only their
own states, if that. And, therefore, the presentations will be of the state
of the senses, which differs from the externally existing object. For honey
is not the same thing as a sweet sensation, nor is wormwood the same
as a bitter sensation, but they differ. 73. And if this state differs from
the externally existing object, the presentation will be not of the externally
existing object, but of some other thing different from it. If, therefore,
the intellect judges according to the presentation, it judges badly and
not according to the external object. So, it is absurd to say that external
objects are to be judged according to the presentation.