Sextus Empiricus: Ethics 389
to know what the good is because he does not know what it is, is not
able to know what belongs to it peculiarly and uniquely, so that he might
be able to understand through this the good itself. For it is necessary to
have learned previously the nature of the good itself, and then to go on
to understand the fact that it benefits or that it is worth choosing for its
own sake and that it is instrumental to happiness. 17 5. That the above-
mentioned accidents are not adequate to reveal the conception and the
nature of the good, the dogmatists themselves make evident in practice.
For perhaps everyone admits that the good benefits, that it is worth
choosing for its own sake (which is why the good is called, in a way,
wonderful) and that it is instrumental to happiness. But when they are
asked what is that to which these accidents belong, they fall into an
irreconcilable battle, some saying that it is virtue, others that it is pleasure,
others that it is absence of pain, and others something else. But if what
good itself is were manifested on the basis of the above-mentioned defini-
tions, they would not have quarrelled as if its nature were unknown.
- In this way, therefore, the seemingly outstanding dogmatists differ
regarding the conception of the good. They similarly differ regarding
that which is bad, some saying that bad is 'harm or not other than harm';
some saying that it is 'what is worth avoiding for its own sake'; some
saying that it is 'what is instrumental to unhappiness'. Therefore, perhaps
because they are speaking about certain accidents of bad and not its
substance, they fall into the abovementioned doubt. - They say that that which is indifferent is spoken of in three ways.
In one sense, it is that neither towards which nor away from which an
impulse arises, for instance, the question of whether the number of stars
or the number of hairs on one's head is even. In another sense it is that
towards or away from which an impulse arises, but not more towards
this rather than that, for example, two indistinguishable four-drachma
coins, whenever one has to choose one of them. For an impulse to
choosing one of them does indeed arise, but no more towards this one
than that one. In the third sense they say that 'indifferent' is what
contributes neither to happiness nor unhappiness, as health or wealth.
For that which is sometimes used well and sometimes badly is, they say,
indifferent. They say that they discuss especially this sense of 'indifferent'
in ethics. 178. What should be thought about this conception is evident
from what we said about things good and bad.
It is thus clear that they have not acquainted us with the conception
of each of the above-mentioned, although perhaps in blundering about
in non-existent things, they have experienced nothing surprising. For
some people argue that nothing is by nature good, bad, or indifferent in
the following way.