Sextus Empiricus: Ethics 391
lest we should exclude ourselves from choosing it further. For example,
if it were good to exert ourselves to get a drink, we would not hasten to
get the drink, for when we enjoy the drink we leave off exerting ourselves
to get it. And the situation is similar for hunger and sexual desire and
the rest. Therefore, choosing is not worth choosing for its own sake,
even if it is not annoying. For he who hungers hastens to partake of
food, in order that he might eliminate the annoyance of the hunger, and
similarly for sexual desire and drink.
- But neither is that which is worth choosing the good. For this is
either external to us or in us. But if it is external to us, either it produces
in us a virtuous motion, a desirable stable state, and a delightful condition,
or it does not affect us at all. And if it is not delightful to us, it will
neither be good nor will it impel us to choose it nor will it be worth
choosing at all. But if there arises in us from something external a pleasant
stable state, and an enjoyable condition, the external is not worth choosing
for its own sake, but for the disposition in us that arises when it is
present. 185. So, that which is worth choosing for its own sake cannot
be external to us. But it cannot be in us either. For [in this case] it is
said to pertain to the body alone or the soul alone or to both. But if it
pertains to the body alone, it escapes our awareness, for acts of awareness
are said to be in the soul, whereas they say that the body is considered
non-rational in itself. But if it should be said that [the good] also reaches
the soul, it would seem to be worth choosing because of a grasp by the
soul and a delightful condition. For that which has been judged to be
worth choosing is judged by the intellect, according to them, and not by
a non-rational body. - The remaining alternative is that the good pertains to the soul
alone. But this is impossible judging from what the dogmatists say. For
the soul is perhaps non-existent. But if it exists, then as far as what they
say about it is concerned, it is not grasped, as I argued in the section
dealing with the criterion.^46 How would someone be so bold as to say
that something comes to be in that which is not grasped? 187. In order
that we may pass over these matters, how, then, do they say that the
good comes to be in a soul? Indeed, if Epicurus posits pleasure as the
goal and says that the soul, like everything else, is composed of atoms,
how pleasure can arise in a heap of atoms and assent or judgement that
this is worth choosing and good and that is worth avoiding and bad, is
impossible to say. - PH 2.31-33.